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[DEVELOPING] Impacts of Ukraine Invasion Felt Across the Darknet

Written by DarkOwl Content Team on August 26, 2022. Posted in Blog.

Last updated: April 18 18:30 UTC

The DarkOwl team are actively tracking the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The effects of the kinetic military operation are causing ripples across the global cyber space including critical underground ecosystems across the deep and darknet.

18 April 2022 – 01:12 UTC

DDoSecrets Leaks 222GB of Data from Gazregion Collected by Anonymous Hacktivists

Three different hacktivist groups (Anonymous, nb65, and DepaixPorteur) submitted archives consisting of emails and sensitive corporate files from Gazregion, a Russian supplier specializing in gas pipelines construction with direct support to Gazprom.

There have been numerous claims of attacks against Gazprom since invasion of Ukraine by Anonymous and other cyber offensive groups. nb65 posted to social media they compromised SSK Gazregion on April 3rd with their version of CONTI ransomware.

18 April 2022 – 01:12 UTC

nb65 Claims Attack Against Russian JSC Bank PSCB with CONTI Ransomware

The Hacktivist group, Network Battalion 65 had claimed they successfully attacked JSC Bank PSCB in Russia and successfully encrypted their network with their version of CONTI ransomware.

The group stated they managed to exfiltrated over 1TB of data including financial statements, tokens, tax forms, client information, and sensitive databases before deleting all backups to prevent data and functionality restoration.

The hacktivists further taunted the bank stating how grateful they were the stored so many credentials in Chrome – a browser for which several emergency security patches have been recently released.

We’re very thankful that you store so many credentials in Chrome. Well done. It’s obvious that incident response has started. Good luck getting your data back without us.

15 April 2022 – 21:59 UTC

GhostSec Leaks Data from domain[.]ru Hosting Provider

The Hacktivist group, GhostSec claimed to target Russian internet domain registration provider, domain[.]ru in a cyberattack. The group managed to exfiltrate over 100MB of data including screenshots of sensitive files and excel spreadsheet data.

According to the README file in the data leak, during the breach, GhostSec identified over 4TB of SQL databases, but in all the excitement the team’s presence was caught by the company’s intrusion detection systems and kicked off the network before the SQL data could be harvested.

15 April 2022 – 17:52 UTC

nb65 Confirms Attack on Continent Express; DDoSecrets Leaks 400 GB of Russian Travel Agency’s Data

The attack on a Russian travel agency occurred several days ago and was shortly after confirmed by the organization. DDoSecrets assisted nb65 in leaking over 400GB of sensitive files and databases from the travel agency. The details of the leak have not been confirmed.

15 April 2022 – 14:32 UTC

Anonymous Takes Over Pro-Russian Discord Accounts

Hacktivists from the Anonymous Collective have successfully taken control of several pro-Russian accounts on the chat platform, Discord, and are now using these accounts to circulate pro-Ukrainian messaging. An Anonymous member @v0g3lsec – who has been extremely active in the #opRussia campaign – shared an image of a hacked account where they posted links and information about the information operations group, squad303 to share truths about the invasion via SMS, WhatsApp, and email with random Russian citizens.

14 April 2022 – 20:02 UTC

DDoSecrets Leaks Unprecedented Amount of Email Data from Russian Organizations

In the last three days, DDoSecrets uploaded archives for five (5) different organizations across Russia totaling 1.97 Million emails and 2 TBs of data.

230,000 emails from the Blagoveshchensk City Administration (Благове́щенск) – 150GB
230,000 emails from the Ministry of Culture of the Russian Federation (Министерство культуры Российской Федерации) responsible for state policy regarding art, cinematography, archives, copyright, cultural heritage, and censorship – 446 GB
250,000 emails from the Deptartment of Education of the Strezhevoy (Стрежево́й) City District Administration – 221GB
495,000 emails from the Russian firm Technotec, which has provided oil and gas field services along with chemical reagents used in oil production and transportation – 440GB
768,000 emails from Gazprom Linde Engineering, which specializes in designing gas and petrochemical processing facilities and oil refineries – 728GB

13 April 2022 – 17:09 UTC

CISA Issues Alert About Destructive Malware Targeting US Critical Infrastructure

A joint advisory issued by the Department of Energy (DOE), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) details how nation state actors (likely sponsored by the Russian government) have demonstrated the capability to gain full system access to multiple industrial control system (ICS) and affiliated supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) devices. The critical alert indicated there is an immediate HIGH cybersecurity risk to critical infrastructure around the US. The devices include:

Schneider Electric programmable logic controllers (PLCs);
OMRON Sysmac NEX PLCs; and
Open Platform Communications Unified Architecture (OPC UA) servers.

For more information read the advisory along with recommended security mitigation measures here: https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-103a

12 April 2022 – 15:31 UTC

ATW | Blue Hornet Announces That They are a “State-Sponsored” Group

The “GOD” account representing AgainstTheWest (APT49) on the new BreachedForums (with many users from the now officially seized RaidForums) announced moments ago that they are indeed a “state-sponsored” cyber group with “direct instructions to infiltrate, attack and leak the country of China, Russia, Iran, North Korea & Belarus.” The group’s Twitter account was also blocked by Russia’s Kremlin account earlier this week and the notification of this block was included in the post.

There is no way to verify the accuracy of the statement posted and it’s unclear whether or not the group will continue their operations in support of Ukraine.

11 April 2022 – TIME UNKNOWN

CONTI Claims Responsibility for Cyberattack Against German Wind Turbine Company

On the 31st of March, Nordex wind turbine manufacturing company in Germany suffered a significant cyberattack. CONTI has claimed responsibility for the attack (over 10 days later) posting the company’s name to their public-facing Tor service of victims. We anticipate that sensitive corporate data will be leaked by the RaaS gang shortly.

11 April 2022 – 20:58 UTC

Anonymous Compromises Regional Government of Tver, Russia; Leaks 130,000 Emails from Governor’s Mail Server

Hacktivists from the Anonymous Collective using the monikers DepaixPorteur and wh1t3sh4d0w0x90 have compromised the domain tverreg[.]ru believed to be associated with the Regional Government of Tver, Russia. Tver is located 110 miles (180km) northwest of Moscow on the banks of the Volga River. The archive is over 116GB in size and consists of over 130,000 emails exfiltrated from Governor Igor Rudenya’s email system dating from 2016 through 2022. The governor was appointed by President Putin in 2016.

Anonymous shared a leak consisting of Russian regional governors on the darknet on 23 March 2022.

11 April 2022 – 14:35 UTC

Finland Suffers Cyberattack; Announces They Will Expedite Application for NATO Membership

On April 8th, the Finnish government confirmed many of its military, defense, and foreign affairs webservers experienced unsophisticated, yet concerted DDoS attacks likely originating from Russian threat actors. The cyberattacks coincidentally occurred just as Ukraine President Zelenskyy started to address the Finnish Parliament on the status of the war in Ukraine around 10:30 GMT.

On the same day, the Finnish Minstry of Defense confirmed, hours earlier, Russia state-owned aircraft also breached Finland’s airspace off Porvoo in the Gulf of Finland – the first time in over 2 years. The aircraft, an Ilyushin IL-96-300 cargo transport airplane, was traveling east to west and landed in Berlin.

Both Finland and Sweden have signaled they will be submitting applications to join NATO. According to open-source reporting, Finland will likely finalize their application during the month of May in time for a NATO summit scheduled in Madrid, Spain in June.

Kremlin spokesman, Dmitry Peskov stated that Russia would have to “rebalance the situation ” with its own measures should Sweden and Finland choose to join NATO.

09 April 2022 – 03:39 UTC

ATW | BH Group Leaks Data Stolen from Russian Temporary Work Agency and Recruitment Firm: Rabotut

AgainstTheWest (Blue Hornet) announced on their Telegram channel they have successfully targeted the domain (rabotut[.]ru) for Rabotut, a “federal scale service” supplier in Russia. According to the threat actor, the archive includes the organization’s entire backend and front end source code, API keys, and SSL keys. According to open-sources, Rabotut is a temporary workers agency and provides contract employees to a number of critical government and corporate businesses around the country.

Contents of leak are in the process of verification by Darkowl analysts.

08 April 2022 – 21:41 UTC

KelvinSecurity Team Targets Russian Cryotcurrency Scam Website: alfa-finrase

KelvinSec released data reportedly from the domain (alfa-finrase[.]com) known for trading in fraud data, e.g. passports, driver’s license, and other sensitve PII. The group claims to have exploited the website, shutdown a cryptocurrency scam, deleted 400GB from the site’s server, and exposed 1.4GB of customer data from the deep web store.

07 April 2022 – 19:30 UTC

DDoSecrets Leaks Over 400,000 Russian Organization Emails Exfiltrated by Anonymous Operations

The leak site, DDoSecrets once again assists Anonymous hactivist collective in distributing sensitive data exfiltrated from companies and organizations in Russia. Three archives were leaked – within minutes of each other – for three organizations: Petrofort, Aerogas, and Forest. The data from these corporate email archives date back over decades of commercial activitiy.

Petrofort: 244GB archive consisting of over 300,000 emails between employees and clients. Petrofort is one of the largest office spaces and business centers in Saint Petersburg.
Aerogas: 145GB archive consisting of over 100,000 emails between employees and clients. Aerogas is an engineering company supporting Russia’s critical oil and gas infrastructure and supports such as: Rosneft, NOVATEK, Volgagaz and Purneft.
Forest (Форест): 35GB archive consisting of over 37,000 emails between employees and clients. Forest is a Russian logging and wood manufacturing company associated with many high-valued construction projects across the company.

A representative from DDoSecrets earlier shared thoughts about the extraordinary volume of leak data coming out of Russia earlier this week in a social media post.

06 April 2022 – 21:42 UTC

Anonymous Claims to Attack Russian MAUK Cinema, Mirkino Belebey

Members of Anonymous using the aliases ShadowS3c and Anonfearless3c have allegedly targeted servers for the Russian cinema and movie theatre, Mirkino Belebey (domain:mirkino-belebey[.]ru). The Mirkino theatre is also known as the MAUK Cinema a.k.a. “World of cinema” in the Belebeevsky District of Russia.

The hacktivists have leaked screenshots with credential data from the breached database containing hundreds of usernames, email adresses, and passwords.

This entry will be updated if/when the leak contents can be confirmed.

06 April 2022 – 20:42 UTC

Hajun Project Identifies Russian Soldiers Who Sent Parcels from Belarus Back to Russia

On April 3rd, the Hajun Project published three hours of surveillance camera footage from a CDEK delivery service located in Mazyr, Belarus. The video shows several soldiers from the Russian Armed Forces sending, among other things, items stolen from Ukrainians, during their “special military operation.”

Using leaked personal data available across the darknet and deepweb, the Hajun Project further confirmed the identities of the Russian military consignors and have released the names and phone numbers for at least 50 of the servicemen that sent parcels around the same time as the published camera video.

The Hajun Project maintains a Telegram channel and Twitter account monitoring and tracking the movement of military land and air assets in Belarus.

05 April 2022 – 16:22 UTC

Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence Agency (GURMO) Conduct SCADA Attacks on Gazprom

Due to the sensitivities of on-going military operations, there is limited detail available on the nature of the attack, but it appears that offensive cyber units under the direction of Main Director of Intelligence for the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine conducted SCADA cyberattacks against Gazprom pipelines. The attacks began within 48 hours of a fire at an oil depot in Russia’s Belgorod region last Friday, that western media reported was the first time Ukrainian helicopters had been spotted going across the border.

The cyberattacks likely triggered an underground gas leak from a highly pressurized gas pipeline in the village of Verkhnevilyuysk; the leak was reported in Russian open sources. Shortly after this, an explosion occurred in a main gas pipeline “Urengoy-Center-2” that civilians captured on Russian social media platform, VK as a large fire occurred in the Lysvensky district of the Kama region near the village of Matveevo.

Over pressurizing gas lines through disrupting infrastructure industrial control systems (ICS) is a documented method for using cyber to cause kinetic damage to pipeline critical infrastructure. The Congressional Research Services detailed such security risks to ICS in their 2021 report.

05 April 2022 – 14:21 UTC

Anonymous Leaks Data from Russian Rations Supplier, Korolevskiy

The company, Korolevskiy (korolevskiy[.].ru) appears to supply Russian companies and organizations with grain, nuts, and confectionaries in addition to rations for the military. This cyberattack could impact the availability of some food ingredient supplies, such as sugar, which is already in short supply and skyrocketing in price across the country due to sanctions.

The data leak includes an 82GB archive containing thousands of emails exfiltrated from the company’s mail servers.

05 April 2022 – 12:29 UTC

nb65 Claims to Hack Civilian Travel Service in Retaliation for Bucha Massacre

Anonymous and hacktivists around the world step up their offensive against Russia after images of Russian soldiers’ war crimes and atrocities against civlians in Bucha emerged on Monday.

Network Battalion 65 (nb65) reportedly targeted Continent Express (continent[.]ru), a Russia-based travel and supply company, with Conti’s ransomware variant in retaliation for the crimes.

Continent Express is one of the largest agencies for travel in Russia and helps arrange tickets and accomodations. As of time of writing the public facing website for continent[.] is operational.

Details of the group’s threatening message posted to social media called out the company’s CEO Stanislav Kostyashkinis in the image below.

“Why, you ask? The answer is simple. We read and watched the coverage of Bucha with horror. The utter lack of humanity in the way Russian soldiers have treated the civilian population of Ukraine left us all in tears. The world has pleased with your country to put an end to this madness drive by the mind of a cowardly tyrant: your president.”

(Update 6 April 2022) Earlier today, Continent Express posted to their news section of the website acknowledging the cyberattack but stated that important data and booking systems were not affected.

04 April 2022 – 12:29 UTC

DDoSecrets Distributes Data Exfiltrated by nb65 From Russian Broadcasting Company

Earlier in the campaign, nb65 leaked a sample of files and emails from All-Russia’s State Television and Broadcasting Company (VGTRK / ВГТРК). The Russian state-owned broadcaster operates five national TV stations, two international networks, five radio stations, and over 80 regional TV and radio networks and has been heralded as essential for the “security of the state.”

According to former VGTRK employees, Kremlin officials have dictated how the news should be covered, and provided incendiary phrases meant to discredit Ukraine. According to the former employees, editors normally have freedom to make decisions, but “where big politics are concerned, war and peace, he has no freedom.”

The 786 GB archive contains over 900,000 emails and 4,000 files spanning 20 years of operations at the broadcaster.

04 April 2022 – 06:24 UTC

Anonymous Leaks List of Russian Soldiers Deployed in Bucha

Anonymous shared a PDF file containing the identities of the members Russia’s 64 Motor Rifle Brigade that was positioned in the Kyiv suburb of Bucha. Since Russia’s withdrawl from the village, the atrocities and war crimes carried out by members of the Brigade have come to light.

The PDF consists of 87 pages detailing the identities of over 1,600 members of the Bridage, including their full name, date of birth, and passport number.

The file most likely originated from the Ukrainian government or intelligence services.

03 April 2022 – 06:16 UTC

Anonymous Shares Data Leaked from Russian Federal Agency for State Property Management

Anonymous shared a single PostGreSQL database, presumably from the domain: rosim.gov.ru, containing over 785MB of logged domain Internet activity available via the domain user: kluser. Much of the data is several years old, including IP addresses, domains, user agents of site vistors. Without further analysis, the value of leaking this data other than psychological operations and information warfare is unclear.

03 April 2022 – 05:07 UTC

nb65 Claims to Compromise Russian Gas Pipeline Supplier: SSK Gazregion

nb65 shared on social media that they have successfully hacked SSK Gazregion LLC (domain: ssk-gaz.ru) – a prominent natural gas pipeline construction company – with an ‘improved’ version of Conti’s ransomware. They taunted the company’s IT department, claiming that they also deleted all backups and restoring services would be an issue for the department.

They also claim to have exfiltrated 110GB of sensitive files, emails, and company data during the operation and trolled the company further stating it took forever to steal the data with the “chincy ass soviet connection” they were using for Internet connectivity.

“Federal Government: This will stop as soon as you cease all activity in Ukraine. Until then, fuck you. Your Preisdent is a coward who sends Russian sons away to die for his own ego. War in Ukraine will gain your country nothing but death and more sanctions. none of your internet facing tech is off limits to us.”

“We won’t stop until you stop.”

03 April 2022 – 04:24 UTC

ATW Release Dox of KILLNET Member

Similar to the personal details shared for various APT cyber groups in China, Russia, and North Korea, ATW targeted the pro-Russian cyber group, KILLNET. They released a dox containing the Russian national’s personal information, his social media, contact information, and familial associations.

KILLNET claimed to launch cyberattacks against Polish government and financial networks in support of Putin’s invasion in Ukraine. Last week, KILLNET also reportedly conducted DDoS attacks against the International Cyber Police agency, CYBERPOL and hacked the ticketing system at Bradley International Airport in Connecticut.

02 April 2022 – 17:28 UTC

Darknet Threat Actor, spectre123 Releases Sensitive Databases for the Indian Government and Military

The threat actor is well-known for targeting governments and defence contractors and has been circulating sensitive government databases for some time. This weekend, they released a “mega leak” of Indian government data for the PM Modi adminsitration’s “turning a blind eye to the humanitarian crisis…. in Ukraine.”

Over 40 GB of data is included in 11 different archived files and includes classified (up to TOP SECRET) and Confidential government documents from the following sectors: ALISDA, DGAQA, MSQAA, DRDO, DDP, Joint Defence Secretary India, BSF, MOD and the Indian Navy.

“The Indian government has a remarkably twisted propensity towards turning a blind eye to the humanitarian crisis in their own nation and now as well in Ukraine. It continues to do business with Russia and refuses to speak on the war, all in an effort to maintain their shallow political interests. These documents have been released to show that there are consequences for taking such foolish decisions.”

02 April 2022 – 06:13 UTC

ATW | BH Claims to Leak Personal Details of Members of Nation State APT Cyber Groups: ATP3, APT40, APT38, & APT28

The AgainstTheWest group continued their offensive against Chinese, North Korean, and Russian nation state cyber groups. Releasing a dox-style text file on Telegram and the deep web forum, breached.co, the ATW group included the names, email addresses, socials and Github accounts, credit card data, front companies, and other identifying information about the group’s participants along with other shocking revelations. Some include:

APT38: China and North Korea have collaboratively had a mole inside the United States Congress since 2011.
APT3: Threat actors are closely aligned with employees from Tencent – the Chinese technological giant behind WeChat and QQ.
APT38/APT3: The alias “ph4nt0m” appears in information for both groups and is believed to be affiliated with APT17 from China.
APT40: Threat actors are randomly connected to employees of ByteDance, the parent company for TikTok.

We are unfortunately unable to corroberate the veracity of the information shared by ATW (Blue Hornet).

01 April 2022 – 20:13 UTC

Anonymous Attacks Russian S-300 Supplier: Lipetsk Mechanical Plant

Anonymous shared another large archive of data stolen from a prominent Russian defense manufacturing facility. The archive is nearly 27GB total and consists of company emails and sensitive documents.

Russia’s “Lipetsk Mechanical Plant” produces several defense products for the Russian military and industrial defense complex. Today, the plant is one of the leading and main manufacturers of modernized self-propelled tractors for S-300V4 anti-aircraft missile systems in Russia. The S-300 is one of Russia’s premier air-defense platforms.

01 April 2022 – 16:00 UTC

Anonymous Leaks Multiple Data Archives From Critical Moscow-Based Organizations

Coordinating today through DDoSecrets on distribution, Anonymous shared several highly significant archives, consisting of over 500GB total of emails, files, and databases from critical Russian organizations with close ties to the Russian government.

Department for Church Charity and Social Service of the Russian Orthodox Church: Database containing 57,500 emails from the Russian Orthodox Church’s charitable wing.
Capital Legal Services: 200,000 emails exfiltrated from a prominent Russian law firm includes an additional 89,000 emails are located in a “Purges” mailbox, consisting largely of bounced email notifications, cron jobs and other server notifications.
Mosekspertiza: Three archives consisting of a) 150,000 emails b) 8,200 files and c) multiple databases totally over 400GB of data. Mosekspertiza is a state-owned company setup by the Moscow Chamber of Commerce to provide expert services and consultations to Russian businesses.

1 April 2022 – 08:56 UTC

GhostSec Wreaks Additional Havoc on Alibaba

After ATW attacked Alibaba Cloud days before, Ghost Security has allegedly hacked and deleted Alibaba’s UAE branch’s ElasticSearch service database. They included a leak to the database extracted from the company on their Telegram channel.

We have also deleted everything and even cleared the backups so there is no recovery, and we left a little celebration from us <3

31 March 2022 – TIME UNKNOWN

German Wind Turbine Company Impacted by Cyberattack

A German-based wind turbine – Nordex – with over $6 billion dollars in global sales faced a cyberattack that incident responders caught “in the early stages.” It’s likely the attack is retaliation for Germany pausing on the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline deal with Russia.

“Customers, employees, and other stakeholders may be affected by the shutdown of several IT systems. The Nordex Group will provide further updates when more information is available.”

In the early days of the cyberwar, a cyberattack on the satellite communications company Viasat caused 5,800 Enercon wind turbines in Germany to malfunction.

31 March 2022 – 19:43 UTC

Anonymous Leaks 62,000 Emails from Moscow-Based Marathon Group

Anonymous again targets associates of those closest to Putin launching recent cyberattacks against Marathon Group. The Marathon Group is an investment firm owned by Alexander Vinokurov. Vinokurov is the son-in-law of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Larov and is under heavy sanctions by the EU for providing financial support to Russia. The leaked archive is over 51GB in size and is being distributed via DDoSecrets.

31 March 2022 – 14:31 UTC

Ukraine Government Sets Up Website for Whistleblower Reporting

The Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s Office in coordination with the National Agency on Corruption Prevention and Task Force Ukraine deployed the Whistleblower Portal on the Assets of Persons Involved in the Russian Aggression against Ukraine. The website is setup to provide a secure and anonymous method for the submission of tips and evidence of corruption any activities causing national harm. The website will ideally help in the “tracing, freezing, and confisicating of assets of those involved in Russia’s War Crimes.”

Many OSINT sleuths have identified Russian oligarchs’ and government officials’ assets, like super yachets parked in international ports and submitted photographs via posts on social media. This website could be used to officially report supporting information leading to the seizure of those assets or other correlative intelligence obtained through leaks shared by Anonymous.

30 March 2022 – 22:09 UTC

Database Containing the PII of 56 Million Ukrainian Citizens Leaked on Deep Web

A user on the forum breached.co leaked an arhive containing the personal identification information for over 56 Million citizens of Ukraine. The database includes the full name, dates of birth, and address for the individuals. Its unclear the origins of the data. Members of the forum stated it was the Ukrainian Tax Service and could be dated back to 2018.

30 March 2022 – 21:53 UTC

ATW Continues Offensive Against China, Leaks Alibaba Cloud & Ministry of Justice of PRC Data

The AgainstTheWest/Blue Hornet group have ramped up their attacks against Chinese targets and leaked the largest archive they have exfiltrated to date. ATW successfully breached the e-commerce company Alibaba and have dropped a 30GB archive consisting of Alibaba’s cloud endpoint environment, source code, and customer data. They also released a smaller database obtained from the Ministry of Justice of the People’s Republic of China. Both were shared to the deep web forum, breached.co.

30 March 2022 – 19:49 UTC

Anonymous Continues to Encourage SCADA Attacks; Leaks Default Credentials for COTS Hardware Suppliers

Members of the Anonymous Collective circulate spreadsheets and websites containing the default factory credentials for most commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) vendor hardware. Hardware, that in turn, is often affiliated with and successfully exploited via SCADA-based industrial control system (ICS) cyberattacks.

One list includes 138 unique products including manufacturers such as Emerson, General Electric, Hirshmann, and Schneider Electric accompanied with default factory settings such as username: admin and password:default. Another resource is a surface web website (intentionally not included but available upon request) which lists 531 vendors and over 2,100 passwords deployed with hardware from the factory.

Sadly, most companies will rely on the default passwords upon installaton and do not bother with updating to a more robust credential security standard.

30 March 2022 – 18:19 UTC

Anonymous Leaks 5,500 Emails Stolen from Thozis Corporation

Anonymous successfully attacked Thozis Corporation – a Russian investment firm with links to Zakhar Smushkin of St. Petersburg. According to the Panama Papers, the company is registered in the British Virgin Islands. The firm is allegedly involved in one of the largest development projects in Russia, including a project to build a satellite city within St. Petersburg.

The trove of leaked emails likely include sensitive documents and agreements between the Russian government, its societal elite, and other international entites.

DDoSecrets assisted in the publication of the 5.9GB archive obtained by Anonymous.

30 March 2022 – 17:55 UTC

GhostSec Leaks Shambala Casino Network Data

GhostSec claimed a few days ago they had successfully attacked a prominent casino operator in Russia, known as Shambala.

The hacktivist group targeted the casino as they believed members of the Russian government used Russian casinos to move cash into different currencies besides the Ruble. At least 27 computers were reportedly compromised, data exfiltrated, systems locked, and files erased.

29 March 2022 – 06:12 UTC

Russian Aviation Sector Suffer Additional IT Operational Impacts

A post shared on the Russian Telegram channel, Авиаторщина, indicates that the aviation industry of Russia will have additional impacts to their IT support with the withdrawl of the Swiss-based company, SITA as of 29 March.

According to the Telegram post, SITA shutting down their operations will impact numerous systems utilized by the aviation industry and airlines across Russia.

[translated]

“Products for pilots such as AIRCOM Datalink, AIRCOM FlightMessenger, AIRCOM FlightTracker, and AIRCOM Flight Planning services will no longer be available. Such software is utilized by airlines and flight crews to plan, perform aeronautical calculations and track flights, and more accurately calculate remaining fuel, flight time, etc.”

The company – choosing to withdrawl from operating in Russia due to Putin’s invasion – suffered a significant cyberattack on 24 February, the same day as the invasion of Ukraine, resulting in the compromise of passenger data stored on their SITA Passenger Service System (US) Inc. servers. SITA supports numerous international air carriers.

This annoucement comes within days of the cyberattack against Rosaviatsiya (see below), Russia’s Federal Air Transport Authority.

(Update 30 March – 23:42 UTC) No alias associated with Anonymous has claimed credit for the 28 March cyberattacks against Rosaviatsiya which resulted in 65TB of lost agency data. Interestingly, new Anonymous groups have only recently joined the campaign, including RedCult, increasingly the likelihood that widespread industry sector attacks will continue across Russia.

28 March 2022 – 18:23 UTC

nb65 Claims to Hack JSC Mosexpertiza; Steals 450GB of Sensitive Data

In a social media post, nb65 hacktivist group claims they compromised Joint Stock Company (JSC) Mosexpertiza, Moscow’s independent center for expertise and certifications, via the domain mosekspertiza.ru.

They claim they also infected the domain with, none other than Conti’s “crypto-locking ransomware variant” – released earlier this month in the opRussia campaign. In the process of hacking the network nb65 also exfiltrated 450GB of emails, internal documents, and financial data.

28 March 2022 – 17:07 UTC

Anonymous Leaks 140,000 Emails from Russian Oil & Gas Company, MashOil

Distributed via DDoSecrets, the Anonymous hacktivist collective recently targeted MashOil, releasing over 140,000 sensitive corporate emails from the company.

Moscow-based, MashOil manufacturers equipment for hydraulic fracturing and enhanced oil recovery (EOR); injection, nitrogen and cementing equipment; top drive mobile drilling rigs; directional drilling equipment; and, ejector well clean-up.

Anonymous continues to target companies in Russia and any companies that continue to contribute to economic and financial viability for the Russian Federation.

28 March 2022 – 12:41 UTC

Anonymous Leaks Russian Document Ordering Propaganda Video Development

Knowing propaganda is widely circulated by both Ukrainian and Russian affiliated organizations, Anonymous has leaked an official Russian document, titled “On holding informational events on the Internet”, dated 21 March 2022, stating this was an official “order issued” by the Russian government to develop videos to discredit the Ukrainian military and their treatment of prisoners of war (POWs). The order was signed by the “Temporary Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation”, Dmitry Bulgakov and decrees:

Develop and distribute a series of video materials demonstrating the inhuman behavior of the military personnel of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and nationalist formations on the territory of Ukraine in relatinos to prisoners who showed a voluntary desire to surrender
Develop and distribute sermographic materials, evidence of the use of briefings by captured military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation during the filming
Provide informational support for materials in the comments, the main argument is the violation of the Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners
To impose control over the implmtnation of this order on the head of the Information Warfare and Disguise Department of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

(UPDATE 29 March 2022 – 20:56 UTC) DarkOwl advises that recent open source intelligence research suggests this letter could be fake and disseminated as part of an information operations campaign. Researchers caught signature mismatches of the Russian official, Bulgakov. Such data is a reality in the the fog of asymmetric warfare.

28 March 2022 – 11:58 UTC

Ukrainian Defense Intelligence Doxxes 620 Russian FSB Agents

The Ukrainian Military Intelligence Agency of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, known simily as Defence Intelligence of Ukraine or GUR, has leaked the identities of over 600 Russian FSB spies. The database includes the agents’ full names, dates of birth, passport numbers, passport dates of issue, registration addresses as well as other identifying markers for the FSB employees.

Many of these agents may be conducting covert operations around the world and leaking their identities may compromise the success of their operations.

28 March 2022 – 11:05 UTC

ATW (BH) Targets Chinese Companys and Government Organizations

After a brief vacation announced on 23 March, the AgainstTheWest (Blue_Hornet) group returns with concerted attacks against a number of Chinese companies and government organizations. The group claims they successfully attacked the following:

The group also referenced a supply-chain software dependency attack, via a poisoned burgeon-r3 NPM package.

Fenglian Technology-Digital Ecological Platform Solution
Bluetopo China security development tool
China Pat Intellectual Property
Weipass
Ministry of Transport China
Freemud Software (supplier to Starbucks)
China Joint Convention Committee.

Shortly after the announcement and initial round of leaks, the group also released source code affiliated with China Guangfa Bank, along with associated Maven releases. The group also claims to have breached the Chinese social messaging platform, weChat.

We are still evaluating the data and determining the specific types of data compromised and released.

28 March 2022 – 03:22 UTC

Russian Federal Air Transport Agency, Rosaviatsiya Confirms CyberAttack; 65TB of Data Erased

The civil aviation agency Rosaviatsiyan responsible for air cargo transportation confirmed with a letter shared on the Russian Telegram channel, Авиаторщина that their website domain favt.ru was offline since Saturday due to a significant cyber attack. The attacks had severely impacted their ability to plan and conduct flight operations and the agency had resorted to pen-and-paper-based operations in the interim.

The notice stated that over 65TB of emails, files and critical documents had been allegedly erased along with the registry of aircraft and aviation personnel. There were no systems backups to restore from because according to the agency spokesperson, the Ministry of Finance had not allocated funds to purchase backups.

“All incoming and outgoing emails for 1.5 years have been lost. We don’t know how to work…”

“The attack occurred due to poor-quality performance of contractual obligations on the part of the company LLC ‘InfAvia’, which carries out the operation of the IT infrastructure of the Federal Air Transport Agency.”

27 March 2022 – 20:44 UTC

Anonymous Leaks 2.4GB of Emails from Russian Construction Company, RostProekt

Over the weekend, DDoSecrets helped Anonymous distribute over 2 gigabytes of sensitive company emails exfiltrated by breaching a prominent Russian construction company, RostProekt (in Russian: РостПроект). The company primarily operates in Russia, with the head office in Moscow Oblast. RostProekt is a primary contributor to Russia’s lumber and other construction materials merchant wholesalers sector. The breach may impact construction projects in the country.

As of time of writing, the website for the company is online.

25 March 2022 – 20:36 UTC

nb65 Leaks Sample Internal Data from the All-Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company (VGTRK)

The nb65 hacktivist team targeted and released data affiliated with a state-sponsored propaganda broadcasting company of the Russian Federation, VGTRK. The All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, also known as Russian Television and Radio (native: Всероссийская государственная телевизионная и радиовещательная компания) owns and operates five national television stations, two international networks, five radio stations, and over 80 regional TV and radio networks. It also runs the information agency Rossiya Segodnya.

nb65 claims they have successfully compromised the organization’s network and exfiltrated over 750GB of data, much of which consists of employee email (.pst) files from the company’s email network. The group claims to be ‘watching’ for their ‘eventual incident response.’

The group continued to troll the organization…

“Your blue team kinda sucks. Hard to find good IT help when all your techies are fleeing the country, eh?”

25 March 2022 – 18:36 UTC

Anonymous Releases Files Exfiltrated from the Central Bank of Russia

Anonymous has released data the hacktivists collected while conducting attacks against the Central Bank of Russia. The archive, broken up into 10 separate parts consists of over 25GB of archived data consisting of over 35,000 files of sensitive bank data. Earlier in the campaign, we observed several posts containing targeting information, e.g. domains, IP addresses, etc for the bank on the deep web.

24 March 2022 – 20:49 UTC

GNG Claims to Hack Russian Mail Server, mail.ru

Georgia’s Society of Hackers (GNG) announced today they successfully attacked Russia’s equivalent to Gmail, mail.ru, including their maps.mail.ru subdomain. The hacktivist group is in process of exfiltrating the data and will provide the detailed data dump in the next few days.

As of time of writing this, the maps.mail.ru website is online and operational.

24 March 2022 – 14:11 UTC

Anonymous Shares Proof of Hacked ATMs in Russia

Earlier today, users at what appears to be a Sberbank ATM reportedly located in Russia experienced technical errors when selecting the Russian language on the screen. Upon selection, the ATM monitor quickly flashes to the Ukrainian flag and the words Glory to Ukraine (Слава Україні!). See the video captured video here.

ATM malware is widely circulated on the darknet and used extensively in the fraud and financial crime communities.

24 March 2022 – 10:43 UTC

Pro-Russian Killnet Launches Anonymous-Style Campaign Against Ukraine – Targets Poland and NATO

The pro-Russian cyber threat actor group, Killnet have been conducting attacks against Ukraine for several weeks and have stepped up their demands and threats against Ukraine and western Europe. Today, they released a video on social media, mirroring the ominous messaging of an Anonymous-style video with the Russian flag in the background. During the video, the group stated they would attack targets in Poland for their assistance to the Ukrainian government during the invasion. They recently also posted specific targeting information for the National Bank of Poland on their Telegram channel.

“…together with the Russian cyber army, we disabled 57 state websites of the Kiev regime, 19 websites of nationalist parties…”

The group also referred to the Colonial Pipeline attack in the US from May 2021.

[translated] “Let’s remember American gas company attack, which resulted in 40% paralyzed infrastructure of America for few days.”

23 March 2022 – 16:45 UTC

AnonGhost Claims to Hack Russian Street Lighting System and Drops Proofs of Access to Moxa Industrial Wireless Networking Infrastructure

AnonGhost known for their attacks against industrial control systems, continued their campaign against Russia by targeting МонтажРегионСтрой г. Рязань street light control system. They stated they successfully shutoff the street lights at 19:35 Moscow time and it was a “gorgeous show.”

Shortly before announcing the breach of the lighting contol panel, AnonGhost also provided proof of access to Moxa (moxa.com) industrial networking devices. They leaked proof of access to router information for a industrial wireless Moxa device, its associated OnCell specifications, along with defacement of the device’s name, description, and login message.

In addition to the proofs they linked to a pastebin file containing over 100 Russian Moxa IP addresses for additional targeting.

It’s unclear where the Moxa device compromise is physically located or whether the Moxa compromise provides direct access to the streetlight control system.

23 March 2022 – 02:44 UTC

BeeHive Cybersecurity Claims They Are Running Ransomware Campaigns Against Russian Targets

When one thought they only hijacked Discord users and trolled pro-Russian ‘hackers’ like @a_lead_1, BeeHive Cybersecurity claims they have been quiet because they are running ransomware operations against targets across Russia.

Oh, in case you guys were curious why we’ve been so quiet. May or may not have a new #ransomware operation running in Ru right now. Alas, we find allies quicker than Putin finds ways to invade Ukraine. We’ll have more details soon but…consider this the public disclosure.

This would not be the first Russia-specific ransomware variant to emerge. According to Trend Micro, RURansom was detected targeting Russian-specific devices with AES-CBC encryption and hard coded salt. Another ransomware variant recently detected, known as “Antiwar” appends the file extension, “putinwillburninhell” to encrypted files.

22 March 2022 – 19:14 UTC

ATW (Blue Hornet) Compromises Russia’s Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring Service with Bitbucket

The AgainstTheWest / Blue Hornet team has recently leaked several internal documents from Russia’s Hydrometeorology and Environmental Monitoring service (spelled by the threat actors as ROSHYDRO). According to open sources, the monitoring service is hosted on the meteorf.ru domain. The data leaks consists of 45 PDF files containing historical software change descriptions and feature requests from the company’s internal software development tracking system. ATW refers to a superadmin account for the GIS FEB RAS Team on Bitbucket in the leak.

21 March 2022 – 22:44 UTC

ATW Returns to Campaign with Attacks Against Almaz-Antey

After a disruption in the ATW team’s cyber activities due to personal issues, the ATW/Blue Hornet team returns leaking a 9GB archive of data allegedly exfiltrated by breaching Almaz-Antey’s corporate networks. The data leak includes employee login data, multiple documents containing PII, confidential and classified intellectual property, schematics, and SQL database files.

Almaz-Antey (Russian: ОАО “Концерн ВКО “Алмаз-Антей”) is one of Russia’s largest defense and arms enterprises, known for the development of Russian anti-aircraft defense systems, cruise missiles, radar systems, artillery shells, and UAVs.

21 March 2022 – 15:26 UTC

Anonymous Targets Russian Software Developer, naumen.ru

Hacktivists from the Anonymous collective have leaked data exfiltrated from Naumen, a software vendor and cloud services provider in Moscow. The company markets itself as “world class IT solutions fully adapted to the Russian market” and lists several prominent international companies as partners. The leaked data consists of an SQL database containing thousands of usernames, email addresses, hashed passwords, and associated PII. The specific purpose and origins of the database from inside Naumen is unclear, but partner companies could experience supply chain / vendor risk issues.

21 March 2022 – 03:27 UTC

KelvinSec Targets Nestle for Continued Commercial Operations in Russia

The KelvinSec ‘hacking’ team have reportedly compromised Nestle in retaliation for continuing to operate and distribute their products in Russia. The group leaked multiple databases from Nestle consisting of customer entity data, orders, payment information, and passwords (10GB total). The group insisted its a “partial” database leak and more data may be released in the future.

Nestle defended its business decision after President Zelenskyy called the company out to protestors on Saturday night in Bern, Switzerland.

(Update 3/22 – 01:48 UTC) Anonymous issues warning and gives a number of US companies 48 hours notice to pull out of Russia or become targets of the #opRussia cyber offensive campaign. Example corporations include: Subway, Chevron, General Mills, Burger King, citrix, and CloudFlare.

20 March 2022 – 23:33 UTC

Anonymous Compromises Russian Social Media VK to Send Message to Millions

Anonymous accesses VK’s messaging platform and sends direct messages to over 12 million Russian users of the social media app. The message, written in Russian, speaks to the realities of the war in Ukraine, the demise of the Russian economy, and threatens that users using the Russian “Z” insignia on as their profile avatar will be targeted by international authorities.

VK users have shared proofs of the message received to confirm the campaign in VK occurred.

20 March 2022 – 15:32 UTC

GhostSec Leaks Military Asset Monitoring System and More from Russian Networks

The leak includes data exfiltrated from a military operational readiness monitoring website (orf-monitor.com), including inventory tracking of key Russian military assets; a leak of a Russian investment company that includes recent Chinese contract data; and lastly, technical data leaks from Russian Defense Contractor Kronshtadt, that includes computational specifications related to their UAVs, along with military operational doctrine, etc.

GhostSec teased on their Telegram channel they had more data coming and this archive they were sharing was a sample of a much bigger dataset.

20 March 2022 – 13:40 UTC

Honest Railworkers in Belarus Help Stop Lines Going to Ukraine

According to open source reporting and the hacktivist group known as Cyber Partisans, the railways going out of Belarus into Ukraine have stopped. Earlier in the campaign, Cyber Partisans disrupted rail operations in Belarus using cyber attacks against ticketing systems and switching systems; however, others report that the rails are inoperable due to “honest railworkers” who do not want to see Belarus military equipment transported into Ukraine for use in this war. (Source)

“I recently appealed to Belarusian railway workers not to carry out criminal orders and not transport Russian military forces in the direction of Ukraine. At the present moment, I can say that there is no railway connection between Ukraine and Belarus. I cannot discuss details, but I am grateful to Belarus’s railway workers for what they are doing” – Oleksandr Kamyshin, director of the Ukrzaliznytsya state railroad

20 March 2022 – 10:28 UTC

Arvin Club Takes Down STORMOUS Ransomware’s Tor Onion Service

Shortly after STORMOUS ransomware gang setup a Tor onion service, the Arvin Club ransomware group compromised their site and leaked SQL databases, information, and performance schemas. It’s unclear whether or not this attack occurred out of STORMOUS’s Russian allegiance or if Arvin merely wanted to teach the cyber criminals a lesson in setting up secure sites on the darknet.

The STORMOUS ransomware group had previously operated only on Telegram.

(UPDATE) As of 3/22 the Tor service is still offline.

20 March 2022 – 02:18 UTC

Anonymous Leaks Database from Russian Aerospace Company Utair

Hacktivists from the Anonymous collective have released the customer database for Russia’s Utair airlines. (Russian: ОАО «Авиакомпания «ЮТэйр»). The JSON database appears to have been collected long before the 2022 #opRussia campaign, as the MongoDB is dated 2019. There are records containing personal data for over 530,000 clients using Utair’s services.

18 March 2022 – 21:29 UTC

nB65 Leaks Data from Russian Space Agency

After a disappointing trolling exercise against Kaspersky, the nb65 hacktivist group returns with data leaks from Russia’s Space Agency, Roscosmos. The group claims they still have persistent access to the agency’s vehicle management system and leaked the IP of the compromised network to prove their access. The leaked data archive consists of over 360MB of user and operations manual, along with solar observatory logs.

Hours earlier, the group also claims to have compromised tensor.ru and leaked 1.6GB of compromised emails for a corporate mailbox for the Russian digital signature company.

18 March 2022 – 15:39 UTC

Russia Targets Ukraine Red Cross Website in Cyber Attack

The Ukrainian Red Cross reported their Internet web servers have been hacked, likely by Pro-Russian cyber threat actors. The website domain – redcross.org.ua – is currently offline with the statement “account disabled by administrator.”

The social media account for the Ukrainian Red Cross stated that no personal data of beneficiaries stored on the website were compromised by the cyber attack.

The Ukrainian Red Cross staff and volunteers are busy and actively providing medical aid and support to vulnerable and wounded Ukrainian civilians across the country as Russian military continue their barrage of cruise missile strikes.

17 March 2022 – 11:43 UTC

AnonGhost Leaks Screenshots of GNSS Satellite Hacks Along with IP Addresses

AnonGhost shared several screenshots as proof of attacks they conducted against Russia’s Trimble GNSS satellite interface. They claimed on social media that other “fake Anonymous” accounts had taken credit for the operation. They also leaked 48 unique IP addresses associated with the GNSS satellite systems. The group did not specify the nature of the attacks against the Russian assets.

17 March 2022 – 09:23 UTC

Anonymous Claims to Have Located Putin’s Bunker

Using OSINT analysis involving satellite imagery and topography and landmark comparisons like rivers and powerplants, the Anonymous community claims they have detected President Putin’s bunker. There no means to verify the accuracy of these assertions.

17 March 2022 – 03:58 UTC

Anonymous Leaks 79 GBs of Emails from R&D Department of Transneft – OMEGA

DDoSecrets released the data on behalf of Anonymous hackers operating in cyber campaigns against Russia. Anonymous compromised email inboxes of OMEGA Company, the R&D arm of Russia’s state-controlled pipeline company known as Transneft [Транснефть]. Transneft is the world’s largest oil pipeline company with over 70,000 kilometres (43,000 miles) of trunk pipelines and transports an estimated 80% of oil and 30% of oil products produced in Russia. The emails cover the accounts’ most recent activity, including after the introduction of US sanctions on February 25, 2022. Some of the emails reflect some of the effects of those sanctions.

16 March 2022 – 10:47 UTC

Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Requests Information via Tor

Russia’s external intelligence agency has issued instructions on how to establish secure communcations via their Virutal Reception System (VRS) to relay any threats to the Russian Federation. The call for leads, found on svr.gov.ru, details how to install the Tor anonymous network, details the v3 .onion address of their secure communications system, and advises the informant using PGP in order to further encrypt the details of any messages provided.

“If you are outside Russia and have important information regarding urgent threats to the security of the Russian Federation, you can safely and anonymously share it with us via the virtual reception system (VRS) of the SVR over the TOR network.”

If you are in hostile environment and/or have reasons to worry about your security, do not use a device (smartphone, computer) registered to you or associated in any way with you or people from your personal settings for network access. Relate the importance of information you want to send us with the security measures you are taking to protect yourself!

15 March 2022 – 11:48 UTC

Pro-Russian Group Xaknet Threatens to Attack Critical Infrastructure Information Centers

“We cannot endlessly give you ‘lessons of politeness.’ We demand the cessation of hacker attacks against Russian infrastructures, we demand the cessation of the activities of information centers for the dissemination of fakes.

In case of refusal, we will be forced to use the most sophisticated methods, and reserve the right to act as the enemy does. Critical information infrastructure facilities will become a priority target for the group. All work will be aimed at the complete destablization of the activities of the aforementioned CIIs.”

It’s unclear from the threats what specific websites or services the cyber threat group considers critical infrastructure information services. The IT Army of Ukraine’s extensive information operations spread across most all social media platforms and information communication mediums across Russia.

15 March 2022 – 07:19 UTC

User on Telegram Leaks New Letter from FSB

A user on pro-Ukrainian Telegram channel (name redacted) has released a new letter, reportedly from an FSB agent, translated into English.

The temperature has really risen here, it’s hot and uncomfortable. I won’t be able to communicate for some time here in the future. I hope we can chat normally again in a few days. There are a lot of things that I have to share with you…
The questions are raised by the FSO (Federal Protective Service of the Russian Federation, aka Putin’s Praetorian Guard) and the DKVR (Russian Military Counterintelligence Department). It is precisely the DKVR that is mounted on horseback and is looking for “moles” and traitors here (FSB) and in the Genstaff (General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) regarding leaks of Russian column movements in Ukraine. Now the task of each structure is to transfer the fault to others and to make the guilt of others more visible. Almost all members of the FSB are busy with this task at the moment.

The focus is on us more than others at the moment, due to the hellish circumstances regarding the intra-political situation in Ukraine: We (the FSB) have released reports that at least 2,000 trained civilians in every major city of Ukraine were ready to overthrow Zelensky (President of Ukraine). And that at least 5,000 civilians were ready to come out with flags against Zelensky at the call of Russia. You want to laugh ? We (FSB) were supposed to be the judges to crown Ukrainian politicians who were supposed to start tearing each other apart arguing for the right to be called “Russia’s allies.” We even set criteria on how to select the brightest of the most competent (among Ukrainian politicians). Of course, some concerns have been raised about the possibility that we may not be able to attract a large number of people (Ukrainian politicians) to Western Ukraine, to small towns and to Lvov itself. What do we actually have? Berdyansk, Kherson, Mariupol, Kharkiv are the most populated pro-Russian areas (and there is no support for Russia even there). A plan can fall apart, a plan can be wrong. A plan can give a result of 90%, even 50%, or 10%. And that would be a total failure. Here it is 0.0%.

There is also a question: “How did this happen?” This question is actually a (misleading) trap. Because 0.0% is an estimate derived from many years of work by very serious (high-ranking) officials.
And now it turns out that they are either agents of the enemy or simply incomprehensible (according to the FSO / DKVR who are now looking for “moles” within the FSB).

But the question does not end there. If they are so bad, then who appointed them and who controlled their work? It turns out that they are people of the same quality but of a higher rank. And where does this pyramid of responsibilities stop? At the boss (Putin).
And this is where the evil games begin: Our dear Александр Васильевич (Alexander Vasilyevich Bortnikov – Director of the whole FSB) cannot fail to understand how badly he got caught. (Bortnikov realizes the deep mess he is in now)

And our evil spirits from the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) and the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service – equivalent to the CIA) understand everything [and not only from these two organizations]. The situation is so bad that there are no limits to the possible variations (of events that will happen), but something extraordinary is going to happen.”

Shortly after a first letter from an FSB whistleblower surfaced around 5 March, Putin quietly placed his FSB chief, Sergei Beseda and his deputy on house arrest last Sunday. While telling the public he arrested them for embezzlement charges, according to open-source reports, the “real reason is unreliable, incomplete, and partially false information about the political situation in Ukraine” and Putin is holding them responsible for the Ukrainians’ success in the invasion thus far.

14 March 2022 – 12:00 UTC

Russian State Duma of the Federal Assembly Confirms Censorship of VPNs

Citing it was “a difficult task” Alexander Khinshtein, chairman of the State Duma Committee on Information Policy, commented that Russia’s media and propaganda agency, Roskomnadzor has been tasked with blocking over two dozen VPNs [virtual private networks] across Russia. (Source)

We anticipate that number to increase as Putin continues to crack down on Russian citizens’ media consumption.

VPNs have been targeted by Russian authorities since 2017, when an initial VPN law was passed. In 2019 many of the VPN providers across Russia received compliance demands from Roskomnadzor representatives via email – captured in the image below.

The demand for VPNs in the country has reportedly increased by over 2,000% in the last month. Users on Telegram encourage widespread use of anonymity tools like VPNs and Tor, and share links to VPN services still in operation and accessible in the region. Many of the VPNs are available via Telegram directly and offer free trial subscriptions to Russian users.

14 March 2022

Russian Cyber Actors Setup IT Army of Russia Group

The collective of cyber threat actors self identifies as the “IT Army of Russia”, mirroring the IT Army of Ukraine Telegram initiative, and claims it has targeted critical Ukrainian cyber services with DDoS attacks. The group has less than a 100 subscribers and many of the members are affiliated with the Killnet forum.

The group recently posted a detailed dox containing personal information for President Volodymyr Zelenskyy [in Ukrainian: Володимир Олександрович Зеленський]. The dossier contains specific information such as his date of birth, passport number, car registration details, and familial associations.

13 March 2022 – 09:31 UTC

Anonymous Germany Exfiltrates Data from Russian Rosneft Operations in Germany

An Anonymous hacktivist group from Germany, referring to themselves as “AnonLeaks” had access to the networks of Russia’s Rosneft subsidiary in Deutchland for almost two weeks and exfiltrated over 20 terrabytes of corporate data. According to a preliminary review, the data consists of laptop backups, virtual disk images, excel files, work instructions, and other operational information for the refinery.

Anonymous Germany emphasizes they did not have access to critical infrastructure in Germany, nor was the intent of their operation to access critical infrastructure for the refinery or compromise it in any way.

Rosneft is Germany’s third largest petroleum refinery company, processing roughly 12.5 million tons of crude oil per year.

(Update) Details of the leaked data has appeared on a dedicated Tor darknet service setup by the hacktivists.

13 March 2022 – 07:19 UTC

nB65 Claims to Be Jonathan Scott, a US-based Malware Researcher

Since the invasion, a social media account reportedly affiliated with the group nB65 was extremely active in sharing their leaks and targets across Russian networks – including claims of accessing Roscomos Space Agency. Most recently, they stated they had access to Kaspersky’s source code, with many teasers in the hours leading up to a what amassed to a disappointing dump of publicly available code from the Russian antivirus software developer. The group essentially trolled Kaspersky and received heavy criticism from members of the information security research community.

The owner of the group’s Twitter account claimed today they were in real life, Jonathan Scott, a US-based Computer Science PhD student researching mobile spyware and IoT malware. Shortly after, the Twitter account for the group was deleted.

11 March 2022 – 06:25 UTC

GhostSec Claims to Access, Shutdown, and Deface Control Panel of Russian ICS via SCADA Attack

GhostSec continues their offensive against Russian critical infrastructure with attacks affecting industrial controls systems. Today, they claimed they successfully accessed an unknown Russian industrial control system, deface the control panel, and shut the system down. They also stated they deleted the backups to make restoring services more challenging.

They included the screenshot below which appears to correlate to a typical ICS system. The name or location of the network was not identified.

11 March 2022 – 01:34 UTC

BeeHive Cybersecurity Enters Campaign and Targets Pro-Russian Discord Users

A pro-Ukrainian group, known as “BeeHive Cybersecurity” claims to have attacked over 2,700 pro-Russian Discord users, compromising their accounts and defacing their profiles with statements about the realities in Ukraine posted in English, Ukrainian, and Russian.

The group insinuates that they “CnC [command and control] the platforms of the ignorant” and use compromised devices to help combat disinformation.

10 March 2022 – 12:30 UTC

KelvinSec Leaks Private Chats from Darknet Tor Service: Database Market

KelvinSec, a pro-Ukrainian cyber threat actor on the darknet, has leaked 3,178 files containing the private chats from DATABASE Market. DATABSE is a relatively newly-launched service on Tor, where carding and fraud cyber-criminals congregate and transact.

The service is allegedly hosted by IT Resheniya on the IP address 45.155.204.178. KelvinSec reported they infilitrated the market via an insecure direct object reference vulnerability, commonly called “IDOR” which gives an attacker access to the website’s hidden information.

The compromised Tor service is still active as of time of writing.

10 March 2022 – 11:24 UTC

DDoSecrets Leaks Over 800GB of Data from Russian Media Censor, Roskomnadzor

The whistleblower leak site, DDoSecrets has obtained 360,000 files from Роскомнадзор (Roskomnadzor) via hacktivists from the Anonymous campaign against Russia. Roskomnadzor is a Russian state-controlled agency responsible for monitoring, controlling and censoring Russian mass media. The agency is responsible for the recent crackdowns on digital bans of Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. The two part dataset totals over 800 GB including files, emails, and information critical about their operations.

10 March 2022 – 08:35 UTC

GhostSec Hits Hundreds of Printers Across Russia

GhostSec reportedly hacks hundreds of printers across Russia to spread the message about realities in Ukraine. They tagged on to the announcement an obscure 4chan meme, “Hey Russia do you liek mudkipz?” on their Telegram channel. The stated they are targeting Russian government and military networks for the printer exploit.

9 March 2022 – 20:05 UTC

Pro-Russian Group, devilix-EU Joins Campaign Against Ukraine and the US

Late last week, a new Pro-Russian persona appeared on social media and began sharing pro-Russia propaganda, Pro-Trump rhetoric, and counter #opRussia Anonymous content. Over the last five days, they’ve ramped up their attacks claiming to have compromised AWS instances, Microsoft IIS sysstems, and performed BGP hijacking with mentions of several US-based IP addresses.

The group makes further claims that they’re named after their own custom ransomware, “DEVILIX shark.”

DEVILIX named as me is one of the strongest viruses on the world DEVILIX shark is ransomware which can do anything we can create BotNet. where we want. Just a Simple but it’s not.

They most recently shared their thoughts about the cyber war in Russian, declaring that this was not about Ukraine and Russia, but the US and NATO and their intent to keep Russia and Ukraine divided.

Я вижу, что речь идет о двух сторонах, России и Украине. Почему мы разделены из-за политики? Разве вы не видите, что здесь делает Запад и хочет, чтобы мы были разделены. НАТО избежало конфликтов, и теперь привет! Слава России

[Google Translate]

I see that we are talking about two sides, Russia and Ukraine. Why are we divided because of politics? Don’t you see what the West is doing here and wants us to be divided. NATO has avoided conflicts, and now hello! Glory to Russia

8 March 2022 – 21:05 UTC

Anonymous Hacks Hundreds of Russian Security Cameras, Many Affiliated with Russian Government Ministries

Hacktivists from the Anonymous Collective successfully tapped the security camera feeds of hundreds of retail businesses, restaurants, schools, and government installations across Russia. They setup a website to share the leaked camera feeds — all to discover some where critical security offices. Anonymous also defaced security camera displays with the message:

Putin is killing children
352 Ukrainian civilians dead
Russia lied to 200rf.com
Slava Ukraini! Hacked by Anonymous

8 March 2022 – 18:34 UTC

nb65 Group Claims to Have Acquired Kaspersky’s Source Code

After keeping quiet for several days, the group sent out mysterious posts across social media claiming to have accessed Kaspersky source code and found “interesting relationships” in this code.

They also claimed it was “sloppier than Putin’s invasion.”

7 March 2022 – 17:31 UTC

22nd Member of Notorious TrickBot Gang Doxxed

The pro-Ukrainian affiliate of the Trickbot cybercriminal empire has leaked the personal identity of 22 key members of the gang along with private chats between group members. Since the 4th of March, DarkOwl has seen the following aliases mentioned: baget, strix, fire, liam, mushroom, manuel, verto, weldon, zulas, naned, angelo, basil, hector, frog, core, rocco, allen, cypher, flip, dar, and gabr.

7 March 2022 – 13:01 UTC

Digital Cobra Gang Claims 49 “A-Groups” Led by Conti and Cobra Are Attacking America Cyberspace

The Pro-Russian group entered the campaign shortly after Anonymous started #opRussia (28 Feb) with the statement:

“DIGITAL COBRA GANG DCG has officially declared cyber war on hackers who attacking Russia as well and to protect justice”

They’ve given little indication of success, other than inflated claims they have acquired over 92Tb data from US’s military personnel files but no proof has been published.

Earlier today, they posted that members of Conti were helping and 49 “A-team” groups were hacking Amera.

(9 March 2022) – US AWS and Azure cloud platforms have experienced higher than normal traffic on the network but no major disruptions.

7 March 2022 – 06:44 UTC

RedBanditsRU Leaks Russian Electrical Grid Source Code Data

The pro-Russian group, originally assembled to counter-hack Anonymous and cyber actors targeting Russian organizations, posted today that they are leaking the source code Rosseti Centre’s [mrsk-1[.]ru] electrical grid networking infrastructure. Rosseti Centre provides reliable electricity for more than 13 million people in the subjects of the Central Federal District of the Russian Federation.

The group is sharing this information because they believe Putin and his supporters are “leading this country to an apocalypse state.”

DarkOwl warns security researchers opening these archives should always use isolated sandbox environments in the event there is malware and viruses included in the leak.

7 March 2022 – 04:55 UTC

AgainstTheWest (ATW) Returns to the Fight and Drops Multiple Leaks of Russian Corporate Data

In the last 24 hours, ATW dropped URLs for at least 7 leaks corresponding to various Russian technical companies and organizations, reportedly breached by the cybercriminal group. ATW’s participation in the campaign has been controversial as they have had multiple dramatic departures and returns to the campaign and reports of “health issues” of some of the team’s members.

Security researchers reviewing the information from dataleaks last week calls into question the veracity of the information ATW is sharing. Checkpoint released analysis stating that after, “checking their claims deeper reveals that for many of the claims there are no solid proofs apart of very generic screenshots that are allegedly from the breached organizations.”

(Update 7 March 2022 – 18:36 UTC) The group also posted to their Telegram channel that they had successfully breached a Russian cybersecurity company that has been “hording” US-based government data, exposure of multiple SonarQube instances and requested someone get in touch with them immediately. It’s unclear if this is legitimate or just further ego inflation.

6 March 2022

Free Civilian Tor Service Leaks Entire DIIA Contents

Recently, the administrator of Free Civilian shared a post on their Tor service containing the entire Ukraine’s DIIA database of users. They stated the buyer of the database consented to the release, with the understanding some records were deleted. The downloads consist of 60+ archives containing gigabytes of data. The download links have been unstable since DarkOwl discovered them.

The administrator also expressed desire to have the ban on their “Vaticano” Raid Forums account lifted, claiming this leak proved the legitimacy of the information they shared back in January.

Recently, screenshots of an indictment for the alleged seizure of Raid Forums on VeriSign has been in circulation, after users spoke of rifts between pro-Ukrainian users and Russian hackers, potential FBI seizures, and the alleged hijacking the alias of former admin Omnipotent on Darknet World. Prominent users from the forum have setup RF2 and advised any old working Raidforums links are likely phishing logins for the FBI.

6 March 2022 – 18:43 UTC

Anonymous Continues Information Warfare Against Russian Media; Video Services Wink and ivi Stream Anti-War Messaging

After Putin’s overt authoritarian take on media sharing the realities of the war in Ukraine, Anonymous managed to hack Russian video services Wink and ivi to stream pro-Ukrainian messages and video of the conflict.

This weekend, Putin’s parliament passed a “fake-news” law imposing prison sentences for media using the words “war” or “invasion” prompting numerous western outlets to pull their journalists and suspend operation.

6 March 2022 – 15:39 UTC

AnonGhost Enters Campaign and Claims SCADA Attacks Against Multiple Russian Infrastructure Targets

This weekend, AnonGhost entered Anonymous’ #opRussia campaign with a vengence, and claims today they have hacked multiple Russian infrastructure control systems via SCADA attacks and “shut it down.”

They list the following targets:

Волховский РПУ> Volkhov RPU
Бокситогорский РПУ> Boksitogorsk RPU
Лужский РПУ> Luga RPU
Сланцевский РПУ> Slantsevsky RPU
Тихвинский РПУ> Tikhvinsky RPU
Выборгское РПУ> Vyborg RPU

This is after they leaked data from 9 Russian commercial servers hours earlier.

azovkomeks[.]ru
vserver24[.]ru
dvpt[.]ru
ach[.]gov[.]ru
itmo[.]ru
vpmt[.]ru
pvlt[.]ru
hwcompany[.]ru
corbina[.]ru

DarkOwl is in the process of pulling in this data to review and assess the contents of all of the databases.

The AnonGhost group is reportedly one of the more senior anonymous hacktivist teams in the underground, with reporting of the group going back to the early 2010s. According to open-source reporting, AnonGhost was led by Mauritania Attacker. In an online interview with a hacker’s blog in 2013, Mauritania Attacker claimed to be a 25 year old male from Mauritania who started hacking at a young age by joining TeaMp0isoN and ZCompany Hacking Crew (ZHC), two hacking groups known for their attacks of high-profile targets such as NATO, NASA, the UN, and Facebook. (Source)

For those who remember Stuxnet, SCADA type attacks are controversial as there is a fine line between disruption and destruction. Services knocked offline but able to be restored is disruptive and inconvient, causing delays in operation and psychological concern over the safety of such services. However, disruptions that lead to destructive events, e.g. hard disks wiped and unrecoverable, de-railed trains, power plant overheating resulting in explosions, & satellites falling out of the sky are considered serious and may be interpreted as an act of war and result in severe retaliation.

Yesterday, Putin declared western sanctions an act of war and uttered similar threats about hacking satellites earlier this week.

6 March 2022 – 14:52 UTC

GhostSec Returns with Leaks from Russia’s Joint Institute for Nuclear Research (JINR) and Department of Information (DOI) FTP Server Data

Hours ago, an archive consisting of several gigabyte emerged from GhostSec reportedly containing information from Russia’s nuclear research and disinformation activities. GhostSec has been silent for most the last week, perhaps busy with this activity.

According to their website (jinr.ru), the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research is an international intergovernmental organization established through the Convention signed on 26 March 1956 by eleven founding States and registered with the United Nations on 1 February 1957.

As of time of writing, the public facing website is online.

6 March 2022 – 12:34 UTC

Anonymous Dumps Leak of 139 Million Russian Email Addresses

An archive of over 139 Million email addresses, broken up into 15 separate files with mail_ru at the beginning of each file, lists the email addresses for presumed account holders for mail_ru services. VK (VKontakte) assimilated mail.ru email services into its internet services conglomerate in the fall of 2021.

The files included two additional HTML files with ominous warnings – possibly shared on the servers from which these leaks were obtained.

[image translation]

Russian soldiers!
If you think that you are going to an exercise, in fact you are being sent to Ukraine to DIE.

DarkOwl has not determined the veracity of this data, nor confirmed how these emails were obtained; some combolists of this nature are created as an aggregation of other leaked data.

As of time of writing, mail.ru’s public facing website is still online and operational.

5 March 2022 – 20:41 UTC

Anonymous Targets Russian FSB; Letter Appears from Possible FSB Whistleblower

The Federal Security Service (FSB) of the Russian Federation [Федеральная служба безопасности (ФСБ)] is the principal security and intelligence agency of Russia and the main successor agency to the Soviet Union’s KGB.

Earlier today, Anonymous hacktivists targeted the FSB (at the direction of the IT Army Ukraine) and managed to take the external facing website offline. Rumors on social media and chatrooms suggested Anonymous managed to “breach” the FSB’s server.

Shortly after the announcement of the website’s offline status (e.g. #TangoDown) a deep web paste emerged containing a list of 62 subdomains for the fsb.ru domain. This could be for additional targeting and exploitation.

The stability and alliances of members of the FSB are in question by threat intelligence and security researchers across the community. Last night, an alleged FSB whistle-blower letter surfaced (via the founder of http://gulagu.net) that damned Russia’s military performance in Ukraine and predicted a disaster for the RU in the next weeks and months. An English translation of the letter has appeared in the deep web (excerpt below).

To be honest, the Pandora’s box is open – a real global horror will begin by the summer – global famine is inevitable (Russia and Ukraine were the main suppliers of grain in the world, this year’s harvest will be smaller, and logistical problems will bring the catastrophe to a peak point). I can’t tell you what guided those at the top when deciding on the operation, but now they are methodically lowering all the dogs on us (the Service).

We are scolded for analytics – this is very in my profile, so I will explain what is wrong. Recently, we have been increasingly pressed to customize reports to the requirements of management – I once touched on this topic. All these political consultants, politicians and their retinue, influence teams – all this created chaos. Strong. Most importantly, no one knew that there would be such a war, they hid it from everyone.

And here’s an example for you: you are asked (conditionally) to calculate the possibility of human rights protection in different conditions, including the attack of prisons by meteorites. You specify about meteorites, they tell you – this is so, reinsurance for calculations, nothing like this will happen. You understand that the report will be just for show, but you need to write in a victorious style so that there are no questions, they say, why do you have so many problems, did you really work badly. In general, a report is being written that when a meteorite falls, we have everything to eliminate the consequences, we are great, everything is fine.

And you concentrate on tasks that are real – we don’t have enough strength anyway. And then suddenly they really throw meteorites and expect that everything will be according to your analytics, which was written from the bulldozer.

That is why we have a total piz_ets – I don’t even want to pick another word.

5 March 2022 – 16:37 UTC

Anonymous Claims to Breach Yandex (Russia’s Mail and Search Service); Leaks Account Credentials

DarkOwl discovered two leaks shared through the Anonymous hacktivist collective network consisting of over 5.2 Million user accounts’ email addresses and password combinations. We are in the process of analyzing this data leak to determine the veracity of its contents. 1.1 Million Yandex accounts were previously dumped in 2014. Many hackers are using #opRussia to opportunistically claim clout for breaches that did not occur, when in reality they are circulating old previously dumped data and/or verifying accounts by credential stuffing.

5 March 2022 – 15:23 UTC

Paypal Suspends Service in Russia

Paypal announced on LinkedIn they would be halting its operations in Russia; a statement released days after suspending signing up new users on the payment platform on Tuesday. Dan Schulman, CEO wrote:

We remain steadfast in our commitment to bring our unique capabilities and resources to bear to support humanitarian relief to those suffering in Ukraine who desperately need assistance. We will also continue to care for each other as a global employee community during this difficult and consequential time.

On Wednesday, 3 March, the IT Army of Ukraine launched a petition calling for all supporters to sign a petition on change.org:

[TRANSLATION]

While Ukraine protects its people and places, and Russia faces the radical consequences of its war crimes, the most popular payment service via PayPal is still available to the aggressor. This means that it also helps finance the bloody war against Ukraine through PayPal.

We are absolutely sure that modern technologies are a powerful response to tanks, grads and missiles. We call on the company to block its services in Russia via PayPal and launch them in Ukraine, as well as provide an opportunity to raise funds to restore justice and peace in our country and the world.

5 March 2022 – 15:03 UTC

Anonymous Leaks Private RocketChat Conversations from Russian Government Officials

Anonymous is targeting Russia by any means possible and managed to collect private chats between Russian officials on the messaging service, rocket.chat. After review, these chats are different from the ones dropped by @contileaks last week.

The chat includes the network ID, username, and “real name” of 14 members of the chat group. The domain associated with the leak corresponds to the official website of the Russian government and the Governor of the Moscow region.

5 March 2022 – 06:04 UTC

squad303 Sets Up SMS Messaging System to Text Random Russian Citizen Phone Numbers

With the lack of Russian media coverage of the invasion of Ukraine and the intentional misinformation spread by Putin’s disinformation agencies, a pro-Ukraine hacktivist collective, known as squad303 setup an SMS messaging system for citizens around the globe to use to randomly text Russian citizens a scripted message about the nature of world events.

The squad303 team also setup an API for more advanced users.

Update: As of 8AM UTC, 6 March 2022, the service had been used to send over 2 Million texts Russian mobile phone numbers.

The team also reports of suffering from heavy DDoS attacks from pro-Russian cyber actors.

5 March 2022 – 02:34 UTC

Anonymous Hackers Claim to Have Accessed Communication Data for a Russian Military Satellite

After nb65’s reported success accessing Roscosmos earlier this week, it appears that members of the Anonymous collective under the campaign #opRussia have ventured into breaching the communications of Russian military satellite for data collection. The satellite – designated COSMOS 2492 (aka glonass132) is likely active in geospatial intelligence collection over Ukraine for Russia. (note: the original indication of the connection occurred 4 March 2022 @ 09:35 by Anonymous collective member, @shadow_xor.)

DarkOwl also uncovered a leak shared by LulzSec member @shadow_xor titled, “Leak_RUSAT_shadow_xor.zip” which contains significant geopositioning data since the satellite’s launch in 2014. The hacker stated they could not change the coordinates of the satellite, but did capture orbital, passage, and communications data.

Our original reporting on this suggested the hackers were Russian-based, but further analysis only indicated that a number of Russian-based hackers supported the attack on COSMOS 2492.

4 March 2022 – 18:16 UTC

Putin Officially Bans Facebook in Russia

In order to combat the information operations campaign against them online, Putin ordered for ISPs to block Facebook servers and websites across Russia. Security researchers also note an uptick in Russian trolls on social media with bot accounts promoting Putin’s military operations in Ukraine.

Putin’s parliament also passed a law imposing prison terms of up to 15 years for individuals spreading intentionally “fake news” about the military. The terms “invasion” and “war” are no longer allowed in press and media coverage.

Several foreign and Western media outlets, including BBC, CNN, and Bloomberg, have temporarily suspended reporting on the war from Russia.

4 March 2022 – 09:44 UTC

NB65 Teases Information Security Community with Riddles on their Activities

NB65 – the pro-Ukrainian group who claimed responsibility for accessing and shutting down Russia’s spy satellites via SCADA vulnerabilities – teased the information security community that they been quiet cause they were parsing and analyzing numerous vulnerabilities in Russian cyber targets.

If we seem quiet, it’s because we have an olympic sized swimming pool worth of data and vulnerabilities. But here’s some fun that you can participate in…

DarkOwl discovered a post matching the target hidden in the riddle and the content suggests the group has access to RUNNET: Russia’s UNiversity Network.

4 March 2022

IT Army of Ukraine Calls for Volunteers to Support the Internet Forces of Ukraine

Ukraine’s Ministry of Digital Transformation steps up its information warfare against Putin’s propaganda by forming the Internet Forces of Ukraine (ITU). Forming a separate Telegram channel at the start of the month, the channel is dedicated to posting instructions and guidance for citizens around the world that want to aid Ukraine and lack an IT/cybersecurity background.

Друзі, наш ворог, окрім наявної війни у наших містах та селах, веде також інформаційну війну. Не вірте фейкам, не вірте брехні пропаганди путіна – ніякої капітуляції України НЕ БУДЕ!!! У нас потужна армія, ми сильні духом і нас підтримує весь світ! Тому, не ведіться на провокації і вірте в Україну. Поширюйте це серед рідних та близьких у соціальних мережах, щоб вони також не велись на нісенітниці кремля. Ми разом і ми переможемо!!🇺🇦

Friends, our enemy, in addition to the existing war in our cities and villages, is also waging an information war. Do not believe fakes, do not believe the lies of Putin’s propaganda – there will be no capitulation of Ukraine!!! We have a powerful army, we are strong in spirit and we are supported by the whole world! Therefore, do not be fooled by provocations and believe in Ukraine. Spread this to your family and friends on social networks, so that they also do not fall for the Kremlin’s nonsense. We are together and we will win!! 🇺🇦

4 March 2022 – 01:46 UTC

Trickbot Gang Members Doxxed and Links to FSB Confirmed

At 15:00 UTC, before DarkOwl could even finish analyzing the ContiLeaks, a Ukrainian-aligned underground account leaked details of key members of the infamous TrickBot gang. Over the course of the day at a cadence of every 2 hours, dossiers for the individuals appeared on social media. Private chats between members of the gang were included with each of the leaks. 7 male members and their aliases identified: baget, fire, strix, mushroom, manuel, verto, and liam. Twitter has since suspended the account.

3 March 2022 – 20:54 UTC

Russian-Aligned Hackers Target Anonymous Hacktivists in Canada

A pro-Russian cyber group using the name Digital Cobras, claims to have been targeting #opRussia hackers from the Anonymous collective across the US, UK, Greece, and Canada. Earlier today, they posted several names of individuals along with pictures of some of the alleged members of Anonymous.

They also claimed to have “hacked Anonymous’ servers” and downloaded over 260gb of their files and tools. They also claimed to have full access of the administration of Tor Project, including their crypto accounts.

Anonymous does not possess servers or centrally locate their information or tools as it is an organic decentralized collective of hacktivists around the world. Similarly, the Tor Project is run by a network of volunteers.

It is very likely this group is designed to spread disinformation and FUD.

3 March 2022

Size of Zeronet Anonymous Network Increases Since Invasion

In the week since the Putin launched an invasion against the Ukrainian people, DarkOwl has noticed an increase of 385 Zeronet domains in the last week and a near 20% increase in the network’s activity. Zeronet has been historically most heavily used by Chinese threat actors. The trend in “new domain” activity appears to have started on or about February 27th, within hours after the IT Army of Ukraine rallied the underground.

The Tor Project has reported significant increases in the number of unique addresses on Tor on the same day.

3 March 2022 – 17:10 UTC

Anonymous Leaks Database Containing Bank Account Holders Information

bkdr – member of the Anonymous hacktivist collective – released an Excel spreadsheet containing the personal information of over 8,700 business bank account holders in Russia. Full names, passport, DoBs, account standing, etc are included in the file.

3 March 2022 – 15:40 UTC

Pro-Russian Cyber Team, Killnet Claims To Hack Vodafone Services in Ukraine

Killnet, a Pro-Russian organized threat actor has claimed they were successful in attacking Vodafone’s telecommunications services across Ukraine. The group shared links to the vodafone.ua website (as offline) and network graphs proving the website suffered an outage.

The group also claims to have attacked “Anonymous” networks directly, prompting criticism as the Anonymous hacktivist has no central severs or repositories.

[Google Translate]

Cellular communication services under the Vodafone trademark on the territory of Ukraine are provided by the partner of Vodafone Group plc, PRO “VF Ukraine”

⚠ OUR ATTACK WAS REPELLED [REFLECTED] AFTER 4 HOURS.

3 March 2022 – 05:22 UTC

Anonymous Breaches Private Server in Roscosmos and Defaces Website

v0g3lSec – member of the Anonymous hacktivist collective – claims to have infiltrated private servers at the Russian Space Agency, Roscosmos and exfiltrated files from their Luna-Glob moon exploration missions. The archive consists of over 700 MBs. Many of the files are drawings, executables, and technical documents dating back to 2011. A scientific review of the content would be needed to assess the value of the information collected.

In addition the website for the Space Research Institute (IKI) Russian Academy of Sciences (RAN) was also defaced by the same group.

3 March 2022 – 01:11 UTC

Anonymous Leaks Data from Rosatom, Russia’s State Atomic Energy Corporation

According to DarkOwl’s preliminary review of the 74 files, the leak appears to be a mixture of budget data, conference materials, powerpoint presentations, and technical files dating back to 2013. There is random mixture of information included that it is unclear whether this was obtained directly from a breach of the corporation’s servers, an employee at the organization, or collected via OSINT and compiled for use in #opRussia.

“There is no place for dictators in this world. You can’t touch the innocent, Putin. No secret is safe. State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom has been hacked!”

2 March 2022 – 19:55 UTC

ATW Quits Campaign – Cites Conflict with Anonymous, Attribution, and Twitter Suspension

Drama in the group started yesterday with AgainstTheWest claiming Anonymous was taking credit for their successes in the cyber war against Russia. They briefly turned their attention to China announcing several new victims, including the Chinese Science, Technology and Industry for National Defence organization. After their suspension from Twitter earlier today, they announced retirement claiming they had no means for communicating with the public. (Analysts note rebrand to BlueHornet occurred shortly after their announcement)

2 March 2022 – 19:09 UTC

Conti Leak Source Code, Panel, Builder, Decrypter Appear on Darknet Forum

Less than 48 hours after a pro-Ukrainian leaked the infrastructure of the CONTI gang’s operation, including botnet IP addresses and source code executables, users begin circulating the ransomware gang’s critical data across popular darknet forums and discussion boards.

2 March 2022 – 16:35 UTC

Leak Documents Surface Proving War Against Ukraine was Approved on 18 January

Anonymous hackers released photographs of captured documents from Russian troops titled, “WORKING MAP”, and authored by the commander of Russia’s Bomb Battery of the Black Sea Fleet. The maps and documents affirm to the public that the invasion of Ukraine was approved on January 18th with intention to seize the country sometime between 20 February and 06 March 2022. Liveuamap, under intermittent DDoS since this started, confirmed the data.

2 March 2022 – 13:52 UTC

XSS Admin Reports XMPP Jabber Service Ransomed and Heavy DDoS Attacks

A darknet forum popular with the Russian-speaking community has been experiencing technical issues, suffering from Jabber service outages and heavy DDoS attacks. The forum is well known in the darknet for malware discussions and coordination of attacks. The admin shared a post that the jabber service was hit with ransomware and the contents of the chats wiped from the services. They nonchalently suggested users register and continue using the service.

[Translated]

The server didn’t work yesterday. Because of ransom (which, by the way, is prohibited here) we were listed in a spamhouse. Instead of reporting the violation, the “brilliant” spamhouse immediately leafed through us. In principle, for many years I got used to their “adequacy”. I’m not surprised at anything. We have more than 21,000 users, and no one is able to check everyone. To do this, in fact, they came up with feedback contacts (xmpp, e-mail), they are listed everywhere.

Why, I wonder, they don’t block gmail.com ? So many, so to speak, violators of law and order use it, and nothing, for some reason they are not immediately listed.

In parallel with this, a powerful DDoS attack was conducted on us.

Our XMPP project is not commercial, completely free and subsidized. I’ve never understood the point of attacking toads.

At the moment, the functionality has been restored.

An unpleasant moment. Backups according to the law of meanness turned out to be broken. The last one alive was a week ago. Suddenly someone has lost contacts or a toad has disappeared, re-register.

2 March 2022 – 10:33 UTC

Leak Appears with Russian Air Force Officer’s Information

Anonymous leaked another database containing the personal information for over 300,000 of Russia’s military personnel and civilian citizens. The archive, titled “Translated Base Database” contains 35 separate database files containing personal details of the individuals. Information includes: full name, date of birth, age, passport number, address, occupation, etc.

1 March 2022 – 20:46 UTC

Russian Criminal Gang TheRedBanditsRU Recruits on Social Media – Offers Payments for Affiliates

The RedBandits openly recruit “affiliates for certain jobs” stating they did not want white hats, but that they want to “speak to exploit Devloplers, Spammers (phishing skills, vishing etc), Pentesters. We’re building an army!” They incentivize skilled hackers to join their cause for monetary gain, claiming partners would be paid well and to apply directly via qTox.

Earlier today, the group claimed that they did not agree with Putin as a leader nor of his invasion of Ukraine, but will protect him as a citizen of Russia.

“War is good for no one, come, take my hand, make money help your family”

1 March 2022 – 12:57 UTC

STORMOUS Ransomware Group Aligns With Russia

The STORMOUS ransomware group, which has been targeting international victims with their ransomware strain for months, claimed their alliance with the Russian government and threatens greater attacks against Ukraine.

The STORMOUS team has officially announced its support for the Russian governments. And if any party in different parts of the world decides to organize a cyber-attack or cyber-attacks against Russia, we will be in the right direction and will make all our efforts to abandon the supplication of the West, especially the infrastructure. Perhaps the hacking operation that our team carried out for the government of Ukraine and a Ukrainian airline was just a simple operation but what is coming will be bigger.

1 March 2022 – 09:26 UTC

Ukrainian Paper Leaks Personal Data for 120,000 Russian Military Personnel

In an effort to target the Russian soldiers invading Ukraine, the Centre for Defence Strategies in Ukraine has acquired the names and personal data of 120,000 servicemen who are fighting in Ukraine. Ukrainian newspaper, Ukrayinska Pravda has leaked the details of the soldiers which could be one of the biggest information warfare campaigns using doxing mid-military conflict, ever seen.

The doxxed soldiers are likely to face increased engagement on social media and direct phishing attacks.

1 Mar 2022 – 00:38 UTC

NB65 Takes on Russia’s Satellite Technology

nB65 claims that they successfully accessed Russia’s Roscosmos Space Agency and deleted the WS02, ‘rotated’ the credentials and shut down the server. They did not provide any leaks with the social media announcement.

The Russian Space Agency sure does love their satellite imaging. Better yet they sure do love their Vehicle Monitoring System.

Network Battalion isn’t going to give you the IP, that would be too easy, now wouldn’t it? Have a nice Monday fixing your spying tech. Glory to Ukraine.

28 February 2022 – 23:54 UTC

ATW Targets Russia’s Electrical Grid

AgainstTheWest Leaks Information from Russia’s PromEngineering corporation. Archives of corporate emails between employees, clients, vendors, as well as blueprints and engineering documentation for power stations around Russia are included in the leak.

28 February 2022 – 22:00 UTC

CONTI’s Entire Infrastructure Leaked

Does this signal the end of CONTI’s reign as leading RaaS?

Ukrainian aligned affiliate decides to destroy CONTI ransomware gang’s operation by exfiltrating and sharing 141 additional JSON data files of private Jabber chats from 2020, details of their server architecture, their sendmail phishing campaign data information, command and control botnet architecture, and ransomware executables (password protected). Analysis confirms that the gang uses BazarLoader backdoor for installing persistent malware on infected machines.

DarkOwl analysts also noted from leaked Jabber messages that RaaS affiliates were persistent at determining how to evade AV/EDR protection systems like Sophos and Carbon Black. Stating that they had setup sales calls and demos with Carbon Black and Sophos AV providers’ sales teams using proxy companies to gain more information, test the product and attempt to find specifics of the product’s AV/EDR bypass mechanisms.

This reminds us all the importance of vetting and verifying all commercial in-bounds for requests for demos and sales information, especially when it might present an opportunity to learn critical corporate intelligence.

The affiliate leaking the details wrote how this war against their people and Ukraine was breaking their heart.

My comments are coming from the bottom of my heart which is breaking over my dear Ukraine and my people. Looking of what is happening to it breaks my heart and sometimes my heart wants to scream.

28 February 2022 – 21:41 UTC

STORMOUS Ransomware Hits Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

The Pro-Russian STORMOUS ransomware gang claims to have attacked Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, mfa.gov.ua using their custom ransomware. The group posts victims’ information on their Telegram channel, posting in both English and Arabic. The group stated the Ukraine government network “fragile” and called for DDoS attacks them.

Their network is fragile – their various data has been stolen and distributed according to their phone numbers, email, accounts and national card numbers with an internal network hacked and access to most essential files. This is with placing denial attacks on their main site !

28 February 2022 – 18:00 UTC

China’s Huawei Steps in to Assist Russia with ISP Network Instability

According to Chinese deep web forums, Huawei is reportedly building a mobile broadband in Russia to help with internet outages. As of 26 February, at least 50,000 technical experts will be trained in networking and securty in Russia’s R&D centers.

28 February 2022 – 12:00 UTC

Russian Gas Station Pumps Hacked

Video of disabled electric vehicle (EV) charging stations in Russia surface, displaying error status and the following warning:

”Putin is a dick”, “Glory to Ukraine”, ”Glory to our heroes”,” death to our enemies”

27 February 2022 – 23:06 UTC

Anonymous for Ukraine Leaks Customer Data from Sberbank Russia

While Anonymous leaked the files, the credit for the hack goes to Hacktivist group, Georgia Hackers Society. The two text files (bygng.txt & bankmatbygng.txt) appear to be personal data from the financial institution with the bankmat file containing 4,568 records.

27 February 2022 – 21:00 UTC

CONTI RaaS Suffers for Professing Their Allegiance to the Russian Federation

DarkOwl just discovered 393 JSON files containing private Jabber chats from the ransomware group since January 2021 leaked online. Many of CONTI’s affiliates were displeased with the group’s alliance with Russia.

27 February 2022 – 19:00 UTC

ATW Claims to Take Down CoomingProject Ransomware Group

AgainstTheWest assesses “CoomingProject are actually one of the dumbest “threat” groups online.” AgainstTheWest statement on Twitter:

“RIP CoomingProject. All data on them is being passed to relevant authorities in France.”

27 February 2022 – 16:54 UTC

Cyberpartisans Take Belarusian Railway’s Data-Processing Network Offline

The hacktivist group of cyber specialists located in Belarus managed to force the railway switches to manual control mode, to significantly slow down the movement of trains. The webservers for the railway’s domains (pass.rw.by, portal.rw.by, rw.by) are also offline.

The rail services are being essentially held hostage until Russian troops leave Belarus and there is peace in Ukraine.

27 February 2022 – 11:00 UTC

AgainstTheWest Ransomware Gang Enters the Campaign

AgainstTheWest (ATW) claims to have attacked Russia’s Department of Digital Development and Communications of the Administration of the Pskov Region with their own custom “wiper” malware. All data has been reportedly saved and deleted.

27 February 2022 – 09:00 UTC

Anonymous Attacks Russian Critical Infrastructure

Tvingo Telecom offers fiber-optic networking, internet and satellite services. Tvingo Telecom is a major provider to Russian clients.

27 February 2022 – 00:00 UTC

GhostSec Leaks More Data and Claims Attacks Against Belarusian Cybercriminals, GhostWriter

GhostSec is active in the Anonymous cyber war against Russia and released a sample of databases stolen from additional government and municipality sites across Russia (economy.gov.ru and sudak.rk.gov.ru).

They state on their Telegram channel they have been conducting attacks against “Russian hackers” and the “hacker group GhostWriter” (a.k.a. UNC1151).

26 February 2022 – 18:00 UTC

IT ARMY of Ukraine Now Active on Telegram

A Telegram Channel titled “IT ARMY of Ukraine” appeared earlier today to help coordinate cyber activities against Russia. The channel has already accumulated over 96K followers. Posts are shared in Ukrainian and English containing target server IP addresses and media for mass distribution on social media.

Videos of what events are really happening across Ukraine have appeared on intercepted Russian State Television channels.

В найближчу годину буде одне із найголовніших завдань!

26 February 2022 – 16:00 UTC

Anonymous Hackers Interrupt Russian State Television

Multiple reports across underground chatrooms suggest Russian television was allegedly briefly interrupted to play Ukrainian music and display national images. (Source)

Ukraine’s telecommunications’ agency also announced that Russia’s media regulator’s site was down as well.

26 February 2022 – 09:00 UTC

Russia Restricts Facebook and Twitter to Control Information

Open source internet monitoring reporting organizations discovered Twitter has been blocked by multiple ISPs across Russia. Ukraine’s government is regularly posting on social media to show the Russian people they are still fighting in the invasion. Cybercriminals and hacktivist campaigns also disrupt Russia’s information operations by calling out disinformation bots and taking critical communications sites offline. Twitter has reportedly blocked account registrations from IPs originating in the Russian Federation.

Russia’s state-controlled television station, RT, is still offline.

26 February 2022 – 01:00 UTC

Hackers Leak Data from Belarusian Weapons Manufacturer Tetraedr on the Darknet

Anonymous Liberland and the Pwn-Bär Hack Team announce the start of #OpCyberBullyPutin and leak a two-part archive (200GB total) of confidential employee correspondences from prominent defense contractor and radar manufacturer, Tetraedr in Belarus. The first part is the most recent 1,000 emails from each employee inbox, in .EML format. The second part is a complete archive of each inbox in .PST format.

The hacktivists stated they successfully attacked the company through an unpatched ProxyLogon security vulnerability.

25 February 2022 – 23:30 UTC

Russian Military Radio Frequencies Hijacked

Ukrainian radio frequency (RF) hackers intercepted Russian military numbers stations UVB-76, frequency 4625KHz, and trolled Russia communications by playing Swedish pop group Caramella Girls’ Caramelldansen on top of the radio waves.

The group also successfully intercepted frequencies utilized by Russian strategic bomber planes.

25 February 2022

CoomingProject Ransomware Group Announces Support for Russia

Another ransomware gang sides with Russia officially declaring war against anyone conducting cyber attacks against the Russian government on their Telegram channel.

“Hello everyone this is a message we will help the Russian government if cyber attacks and conduct against Russia”

25 February 2022 – 21:00 UTC

Russia’s Gasprom Energy Corporation Knocked Offline

Headquartered in St. Petersburg, Gasprom (ПАО “Газпром”) is the largest natural gas transmission company in Eastern Russia. The company is mostly owned by the Russian government even though the shares are traded publicly.

The Anonymous hacktivist collective, operating their campaign against Russia via the hashtag #OpRussia, has claimed responsibility.

25 February 2022 – 20:00 UTC

Anonymous Hackers Leak Database for Russia’s Ministry of Defense (MoD)

Russia’s gov.ru and mil.ru website server authentication data, including hundreds of government email addresses and credentials, surface on transient deep web paste sites and Telegram channels. Another leak consisting of 60,000 Russian government email addresses is also now in circulation.

GhostSec, also participating in Anonymous’s cyberwar against Russia, #OpRussia, claimed all subdomains for Russia’s military webservers were offline hours earlier as of 11:00 UTC.

Over around 100+ subdomains for the russian military were hosted on this IP (you may check DNSdumpster for validation) now all downed. In Support of the people in Ukraine WE STAND BY YOU!

25 February 2022

CONTI’s decision to side with Russia has dire consequences for the RaaS Gang

The ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) gang CONTI (a.k.a. CONTI News) has officially sided with the Russian Federation against “Western warmongers” in the conflict.

Many of their affiliate partners are reportedly in disagreement – siding with Ukraine – which became evident once certain private chats were leaked on their internal affiliate platform on social media. It’s uncertain how these political divisions will impact the effectiveness of the ransomware gang’s campaigns. Conti revised their WARNING statement claiming they do “not ally with any government and we condemn the ongoing war.”

25 February 2022 – 16:30 UTC

Hundreds of Russian IP Addresses Appear on Deep Web for Targeting

Over 600 IP addresses correlating to key Russian web services emerge on transient paste sites and underground hacker forums. (Source DarkOwl Vision)

25 February 2022 – 05:00 UTC

Anonymous Threatens to Take Russian Industrial Control Systems Hostage

The hacker group known as Anonymous stepped up its participation in defending Ukrainians through its cyber war with Russia. In an ominous video posted to Twitter, the group called for UN to establish a “neutral security belt” between NATO and Russia to ease tensions. They elevated their influence by threatening to “take hostage industrial control systems” against Russia. Expect Us. We do not forgive. We do not forget.

“If tensions continue to worsen in Ukraine, then we can take hostage… industrial control systems.” Expect us. Operation #Russia Engaged

24 February 2022 – 19:00 UTC

Free Civilian Tor Service Announces 54 New Ukrainian Government Database Leaks

The administrator of the Free Civilian Tor Service – who DarkOwl analysts believe is the Raid Forums threat actor, Vaticano – updated their database leaks service, stating they had confidential data for dozens of Ukrainian government services. DarkOwl analyzed these databases closely and confirmed the threat actor likely exfiltrated the data in December 2021. (Source)

24 February 2022 – 17:00 UTC

Russia’s FSB Warns of Potential Attacks against Critical Infrastructure as a result of Ukraine Operations

The National Coordination Center for Computer Incidents (NCSCI) released an official statement warning citizens of Russia of imminent cyber attacks and for the country to brace for the disruption of important digital information resources and services in response to the on-going special military operation in Ukraine.

“Attacks can be aimed at disrupting the functioning of important information resources and services, causing reputational damage, including for political purposes” – NCSCI

24 February 2022 – 05:00 UTC

Cryptocurrency Markets Crash in Wake of Invasion

Bitcoin cryptocurrency fell below $35,000 USD for the first time since January in reaction to the Russian troops crossing over the Ukraine border. Ethereum fell more than 12% in the last 24 hours.

According to open-source reporting, the collective cryptocurrency market has plummeted over $150 billion dollars in value since the tensions began.

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[DEVELOPING] Darknet Economy Surges Around Abortion Rights

Written by DarkOwl Content Team on July 1, 2022. Posted in Blog.

SCOTUS members credit card information continues to be doxxed

July 1, 2022

The recent doxxing of Supreme Justices – presumably in retribution for the Roe v Wade rulings – has spread widely across social media platforms, including Twitter, Instagram, TikTok, and more.

While all members of the Supreme Court have been doxxed to some degree in the past, this latest round of public information sharing contains Credit Card information for at least four Justices.

Many posts circulating on the darknet, deep web, and paste sites include other associated PII (as pictured above), which together form a comprehensive doxx of the targeted Justices that could be exploited for social engineering attacks, fraud and more.

SIEGEDSEC Targets Pro-Life State Governments

27 June 2022

Over the weekend cyber hacktivists enraged about the SCOTUS decision, decided to direct their anger towards their keyboards and targeted the networks of pro-life state governments, e.g. Kentucky and Arkansas. The group claimed to have accessed and exfiltrated several gigabytes of sensitive data, including employee PII from state government servers. The cyber threat group, SiegedSec, who we featured earlier this month, has been recently emboldened by their involvement in the Russia-Ukraine cyber war and stated on their Telegram channel, the attacks against Kentucky and Arkansas are just the beginning with planned continued attacks against pro-life organizations and states with anti-abortion regulations.

“THE ATTACKS WILL CONTINUE!” – SiegedSec

Source: Telegram

SCOTUS Overturns Roe v. Wade

24 June 2022

On Friday morning, the U.S. Supreme Court uploaded their controversial decision on the case titled, DOBBS, STATE HEALTH OFFICER OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ET AL. v. JACKSON WOMEN’S HEALTH ORGANIZATION ET AL; a decision which effectively removed one’s constitutional right to an abortion as provided by the long-standing 1973 Roe v. Wade precedent. The decision sparked widespread protests around the country and conflicts between activists and law enforcement.

Original Report

21 June 2022

As a result of the recent political landscape regarding Roe v. Wade, our analysts reviewed the topic of abortion and observed a surge in darknet economies providing abortion medications and home kits on underground marketplaces.

Background and Political Context

The historical January 1973 Roe v. Wade decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, which legally protected one’s rights to an abortion at the Federal level, is on a precipitous demise in a radical shift in political power across the United States. In a draft majority opinion that was leaked out of the Supreme Court to Politico in early May, the conservative majority of the Supreme Court justices are very likely to overturn the landmark Roe v. Wade and a subsequent 1992 decision — Planned Parenthood v. Casey, with Justice ALITO stating, “Roe was egregiously wrong from the start.”

Figure 1: Source POLITICO

If the position of the draft opinion goes ahead as written – which some legal experts predict might be officially published as early as this week – federal protections for one’s right to an abortion will immediately end and the issue will be tossed back for decision at the individual state level. With recent extreme state-legislative decisions such as the Texas Heartbeat Act criminalizing abortions any time after six weeks of pregnancy, 23 states have some form of restrictive abortion-related legislation in place. 19 states have protected the right to abortion by codifying it into their state laws, Colorado and California have established themselves as “sanctuary states” for women’s reproductive health.

According to the American Pregnancy Association, an abortion is defined as the early termination of a pregnancy and is induced by a clinical surgical procedure or the administration of drugs to remove the embryo and placenta from the female’s uterus. Two drugs associated with the “chemical abortion pill regimen” are oral Mifepristone (Mifeprex) and Misoprostol (Cytotec) used in conjunction to stop the production of pregnancy related hormones and induce contractions of the uterus to expel the embryo.

Impacts Seen on the Darknet

Within a week of the Supreme Court’s leaked draft opinion, DarkOwl analysts observed a noticeable volume of information related to medical abortions materialize – including offers for chemical abortion drugs for sale across the darknet.

Chatter on darknet discussion forums and deep-web adjacent chat platforms foster creating an online community to support US-based individuals’ access to abortion, calling it the “Underground Abortion Railroad” to help connect women with abortion and transportation providers and avoid criminal prosecution.

One forum user identified themselves from Europe and offered to stock up on abortion medications and emergency contraception pills such as “Plan B” from their local pharmacies, offering to ship them at fair market price to those in the United States who cannot access them legally through non-darknet sites.

Another user in a popular darknet forum mentioned a reliable marketplace selling Misoprostol, described as “28 Pills 200MG Safe Home Abortion Method.” The vendor of the marketplace commented on the thread that they don’t actually sell the pills anymore because there were not enough buyers, but would be willing to change their position and offer them again if there was demand.

Monitors on the darknet marketplace suggested has yet to offer a “Safe Home Abortion Method Kit” as mentioned in the thread or abortion-related pills on their site. The same vendor also offers a variety of illegal drugs and narcotics as well, including Cocaine, Percocet, Xanax, weight loss treatments, and Freebase.

Figure 2: Source Dread Darknet Discussion Forum

DarkOwl continues to observe other sources of underground abortion services on offer in its Vision database with multiple advertisements for Misoprostol and Mifeprex, and access to (purportedly) safe abortion services. One supplier recommended those in need of abortion pills contact them via XMPP with OMEMO for a direct, private sale.

Another classified-style advertisement describes the at-home abortion treatment in detail and the medications used, with pricing, ranging from $7 to $16 USD for the abortion-related medications. Multiple forms of contact information was also included.

Other drugs offered for sale on the same classified-advertisement forum have been affiliated with scammers that have no intention of providing the services or goods on offer. Tragically, there is increased risk that darknet scammers will exploit the current political abortion issue in the US for financial gain like they did during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Drugs offered for sale on darknet marketplaces

Figure 3: Source DarkOwl Vision

Some darknet forum users point readers to “offshore pharmacy sites” where abortion-related medication could be purchased, mentioning a clinic taking online consultations in India among others. A quick OSINT search revealed numerous Surface Web domains offering abortion-related medications for purchase. How those sites will operate regarding shipping the drugs to customers in states who have banned abortions once Roe is overturned is yet to be determined.

Overall, opinions on the darknet about abortion are mixed with strong opinions on both sides of the issue. Members of right-wing aligned Telegram channels spin abortion as murder and celebrate the Supreme Court’s position.

Figure 4: Source DarkOwl Vision

While other users support less government over individual choices regardless and view the decision as a potential turning point for the loss of other individual rights.

“I do believe everyone should have a choice, it’s a sensitive topic, but I will stand on democracy, taking peoples choices away is not democracy.” – Dread User

Figure 5: Source DarkOwl Vision

A controversial pro-choice group, Ruth Sent Us (RSU), named after late liberal Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, recently admitted to publishing on social media the home addresses of Chief Justice John Roberts alongside five other conservative associate justices: Samuel Alito, Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, Brett Kavanaugh and Amy Coney Barrett. The group claimed the information was publicly available and never encouraged violence against any of the justices.

The release of such information has fueled on-going deep web forum debates about the topic with some stating such information releases violates 18 USC 1503, which “prohibits ‘endeavors to influence, intimidate or impede… officers of [the] court’.” Despite the online debate, a 26-year old man, Nicholas John Roske, likely relied on such leaked information to target Justice Kavanaugh last week. Roske was arrested for attempted murder after arriving at Kavanuagh’s home with a Glock 17 handgun, ammunition, a knife, zip ties, pepper spray, and duct tape, that he told police he planned to use to break into Kavanaugh’s house and kill him. Other left-leaning U.S. politicians have also been targeted in their homes since the draft opinion leaks with users on Telegram calling them “pro-abortion death cult democrats.”

Figure 6: Source Telegram

DarkOwl analysts have not yet observed abortion pills such as Mifepristone and Misoprostol widely available on principal decentralized darknet markets, but they are available for purchase via threads in discussion forums, as well as classified-style advertisements on transient paste services.

Closing Thoughts

Users across darknet forums have voiced interest in abortion-related pills and services following the leaked Supreme Court documents and advocate for organized protests in support of and against the potential ruling. Once the U.S. Supreme Court officially issues their ruling, we anticipate a more concerted response from darknet marketplaces in offers for abortion related drugs and services. The darknet will also continue to be a resource for activists to organize political protests and circulate sensitive information related to the abortion debate.

Irrespective of which side of the debate one stands, the darknet will continue to fuel the controversy both in support of and criticism of a woman’s right to abortion. In a world of increased digital surveillance and the fundamental privacy-centric nature of Tor and similar anonymous platforms, individuals will seek out like-minded communities on the darknet for social activism related to the topic. DarkOwl predicts an increased use of Tor to organize political protests and circulate sensitive information related to the abortion debate.

Curious about darknet marketplaces or something you read? Interested in learning more? Contact us to find out how darknet data applies to your use case.

DarkOwl’s Busiest Year Ever at ISS World Europe 2026

Written by kathy hoffman on June 25, 2026. Posted in Uncategorized.

June 25, 2026

ISS World Europe is one of the biggest dates in the calendar for intelligence agencies and technology vendors. Widely considered the largest of the ISS World Series conferences, which are held elsewhere during the remainder of the year, DarkOwl was busy (re)connecting with customers old and new – from exhibitors to guests.

In what was DarkOwl’s 10^th year exhibiting and speaking at the event, a booth team of 4 DarkOwlers were on hand at the 2026 edition. For three days the team explained DarkOwl’s role in OSINT workflows, demoing a new structured marketplace feature, collecting product feedback, meeting customers and holding a DarkOwl Vision platform workshop for police officers.

Figure 1: DarkOwl Team talking to ISS World attendees

ISS World Europe – held in Prague – is the world’s largest gathering of regional Law Enforcement, Intelligence and Homeland Security analysts, Telecoms, Financial (and Cyber) Crime investigators and electronic surveillance professionals.

Real estate in the exhibitor halls proved to be at a premium, with many exhibitors filling dead space in corridors, entrances and even service areas to meet this year’s unprecedented demand.

In addition to enabling public-private partnerships in the exhibition halls, ISS World runs exclusive workshops for law enforcement guests. DarkOwl is a regular fixture. DarkOwl held a workshop to educate law enforcement and government analysts managing intelligence and investigations in the digital realm. We spoke about the DarkOwl Vision practitioner journey: from using our technology to accelerate criminal investigations, to educating our practitioners about navigating internal procurement for darknet monitoring tools.

Figure 2: A photo of DarkOwl’s ISS Workshop this year

A notable theme from the conference included the application of agentic AI to investigative workflows. Also, lawful interception in the age of encryption and privacy configuration.

The challenge of harnessing OSINT at-scale was another topic. As OSINT becomes relevant across all intelligence disciplines, there’s a choice to be made: Do we upskill the general population of analysts with OSINT tradecraft, or focus on fusion cells and labs to concentrate OSINT expertise in government?

Overall, whether it was listening and learning from the 15+ exhibitors that are already using DarkOwl, to the young LEA analysts from various EU police forces seeking to do so, ISS World Europe was a reminder of why it’s one of our favorite shows.

Interested in meeting DarkOwl? See where we will be in-person and virtually and request some time! We would love to meet up.

Ransomware Negotiation Tactics and Real-Life Examples

Written by kathy hoffman on June 23, 2026. Posted in Blog.

June 23, 2026

Your files are locked. A countdown timer is ticking. And someone you’ve never met is demanding $2 million in Bitcoin before the clock hits zero.

For thousands of organizations every year, this isn’t a hypothetical; it’s Tuesday morning. And in that moment, the instinct is to panic, pay, and pray. But the organizations that come out ahead aren’t the ones who act the fastest. They’re the ones who act the smartest.

Ransomware negotiation has quietly evolved into a professional discipline, complete with its own playbook, psychology, and practitioners. What looks like a hostage situation is actually a business transaction — one with leverage points, bluffs, and countermoves that most victims never think of using. By employing the right negotiation strategies, organizations may be able to protect critical data, reduce operational disruption, and minimize reputational damage.

Law Enforcement’s Stance

While paying the ransomware may be the individuals first thought, the FBI strongly suggests not paying a ransom in response to an attack. Their reasoning states three separate factors:

No guarantees: Paying does not ensure your network or encrypted files will be successfully restored.
Encourages more crime: Submitting to demands funds the perpetrators and incentivizes them to target you and others again.
Operational funding: Ransomware payments provide capital for threat actors to grow their criminal enterprises.

The U.S. Joint Ransomware Task Force (JRTF), co-chaired by the FBI and CISA, represents a coordinated national effort to combat the growing threat of ransomware attacks. The task force brings together government agencies and private sector partners to improve information sharing, strengthen operational coordination, and streamline the federal response to ransomware incidents. Through joint investigations, threat disruption operations, and the development of cybersecurity best practices, the JRTF plays a critical role in helping organizations prevent, respond to, and recover from ransomware attacks. Its creation marks a significant step toward a more unified and proactive approach to defending against evolving cyber threats.

However, some victims do choose to pay.

Tactics

If your organization has decided to engage in negotiations with the threat actors, several steps should be taken before and during communications to help ensure the situation is managed as effectively and efficiently as possible. The following are recommended tactics and considerations for organizations that choose to pursue negotiations with threat actors.

Before Contacting the Threat Actor

Gather Professional Assistance/a Team: Ransomware response requires coordinated decision-making across security, legal, business continuity, and executive leadership teams, with incident response leads managing containment, forensic analysis, regulatory obligations, and communications. Organizations should never respond to ransomware incidents alone; instead, they should engage cybersecurity experts, CERTs, ransomware recovery specialists, cyber insurance providers, and law enforcement to ensure a structured, legally compliant, and effective response. All communication with attackers should be centralized through a single authorized point of contact, while critical decisions such as ransom payment approval and business continuity actions remain restricted to C-level leadership.
Begin Forensic Analysis: Forensic analysis should determine the extent of both encryption and potential data exfiltration by examining network logs, endpoint detection telemetry, and threat intelligence related to the ransomware variant involved. Incident response teams should confirm whether exfiltration occurred, identify the affected systems, and assess the types of data that may have been compromised, while preserving evidence for legal and regulatory requirements. Understanding the tactics of the ransomware group, such as RansomHub, can help predict the likelihood and timing of data exposure.
Monitor Leak Sites and Extortion Channels Early: Organizations should begin monitoring leak sites and underground channels as soon as there are indications that data may have been stolen. Threat actors increasingly use dedicated leak platforms to apply pressure, damage reputations, and create urgency around payment demands. Monitoring should extend beyond the organization’s primary name to include subsidiaries, brands, executive names, and other identifiable assets. Early visibility into leak activity can help organizations understand the threat actor’s tactics, anticipate public disclosures, and prepare appropriate communications responses.

Many ransomware groups release small samples of allegedly stolen data before publishing larger datasets. Tracking these developments in real time allows organizations to validate claims, assess potential business impact, and make informed decisions without relying solely on information provided by the attacker.

After Initial Contact

Establish Controlled Communication: Centralizing communication prevents mixed messages, unauthorized concessions, and tactical mistakes that can weaken the organization’s position. It also ensures that discussions remain consistent and aligned with legal, operational, and business objectives. The initial response typically acknowledges receipt of the ransom demand while requesting additional time for internal review and executive decision-making. Every interaction should be carefully documented to support legal, regulatory, insurance, and post-incident reporting requirements.
Buy Time and Manage Expectations: Time is one of the most valuable assets during a ransomware incident. Every additional hour allows incident responders to collect forensic evidence, IT teams to validate backup and recovery options, legal teams to conduct sanctions screening, and leadership to evaluate potential courses of action.

Experienced negotiators use legitimate business processes to slow the pace of discussions. Requests for additional approvals, verification of impacted assets, or assessments of operational impact can all create valuable breathing room. Negotiations may pause and resume multiple times as new information emerges, and recovery efforts progress. At the same time, negotiators can begin shaping expectations around what the organization can realistically pay by referencing constraints such as insurance coverage limits, financial approval requirements, or board-authorized spending thresholds.
Keep Record of all Correspondence: If ransom negotiations are pursued, maintain detailed records of all communications and payment instructions to support law enforcement and investigative efforts. Additionally, request that the attackers demonstrate the validity of the decryption key by successfully decrypting several randomly selected files.

Real Life Examples

Instructure (2025) – On May 01, 2026, the threat actor group, ShinyHunters, revealed on their data leak site that they had allegedly breached the education technology company Instructure, a cloud-based education technology company best known for its Canvas learning management system, which schools and universities use to manage coursework, assignments, grading, and communication. The group had claimed to have stolen 280 million records connected to students and staff from over 8K colleges, school districts, and online education platforms. Using Canvas data export feature ShinyHunters was able to harvest “hundreds of gigabytes of user records, messages, and enrollment data”. According to the data leak site, ShinyHunters extended their deadline until May 12, claiming some of the affected institutions were engaging with the group.

In a statement on May 11, Instructure, announced they had reached an “agreement” with ShinyHunters to prevent recently breached data from being leaked. The company also disclosed that ShinyHunters had returned the stolen data and provided proof of destruction. ShinyHunters removed the warning from their leak site and posted a press statement saying they had no comment and all data had been destroyed. The FBI has warned against paying ransoms, noting that doing so does not guarantee threat actors will refrain from selling stolen data. However, the company said it acted in what it believed was the best interest of its “community”.

On May 12, the U.S. House Committee on Homeland Security requested Instructure executives to testify on the two cyberattacks by ShinyHunters on the company. The Homeland Security Committee said the repeated breaches raise “serious questions” about Instructure’s incident response practices and its ability to safeguard the data in its possession. The committee asked Instructure to participate in a briefing by May 21 to address both incidents, including the scope of the compromised data, containment and notification measures, and the company’s coordination with federal agencies.

CWT Global (2020) – In July 2020, the ransomware group Ragnar Locker infiltrated U.S. travel management company, CWT’s network, shutting down more than 30,000 computers and exfiltrating sensitive corporate data. After the attack, the threat actors demanded a $10 million ransom in exchange for a promise not to publicly release the stolen information. To demonstrate the credibility of their threat, Ragnar Locker directed CWT to a password-protected press release hosted on a hidden section of the group’s website, detailing the impending data leak.

Facing significant financial challenges caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, CWT reportedly negotiated the ransom demand down to $4.5 million. The payment was ultimately made in Bitcoin, after which Ragnar Locker claimed to honor its agreement by deleting the stolen data. The group provided CWT with credentials to access a cloud storage repository containing the exfiltrated files and removed the prepared leak announcement from its website.

In an unusual ending to the incident, Ragnar Locker also shared recommendations for improving cybersecurity defenses. Among their suggestions were stronger internal security policies and employee awareness measures, arguing that antivirus software alone is often insufficient to prevent sophisticated ransomware attacks.

University of California San Francisco (2020) – In June 2020, the University of California, San Francisco (UCSF) became the victim of a significant ransomware incident when cybercriminals encrypted critical servers and data belonging to the institution. The attack was carried out by operators of the NetWalker ransomware, a notorious malware strain responsible for numerous high-profile extortion campaigns. Although UCSF’s School of Medicine was heavily involved in leading COVID-19 antibody testing research at the time, university officials stated that the attack was not specifically directed at the institution.

After gaining access to UCSF’s network, the attackers encrypted important files and demanded a substantial ransom for their release. Ultimately, the university agreed to pay more than $1 million to the cybercriminals in exchange for a decryption key and assurances that copies of the stolen data would be returned or destroyed.

According to university officials, the payment enabled the restoration of access to critical files and systems. While UCSF declined to disclose the exact nature of the data involved, it emphasized that there was no evidence suggesting that patient medical records had been compromised during the incident.

Conclusion

While negotiating with ransomware attackers may appear to be the quickest path to recovery, organizations should approach that decision with extreme caution. Paying a ransom can fund future criminal operations, incentivize additional attacks, and potentially mark an organization as a willing target for future extortion attempts.

Perhaps most importantly, payment offers no certainty. Threat actors may fail to provide a working decryption key, demand additional payments, or retain stolen data despite receiving the ransom. As a result, ransomware negotiation should never be viewed as a guaranteed solution.

The most effective defense against ransomware remains preparation: maintaining secure backups, implementing strong cybersecurity controls, developing a tested incident response plan, and engaging experienced legal, cybersecurity, and negotiation professionals when an attack occurs. By focusing on resilience rather than reaction, organizations can reduce the impact of ransomware incidents and make informed decisions that align with both their operational needs and long-term security objectives.

Learn how DarkOwl can help. Contact us.

Marketplace Spotlight: DarkBay

Written by kathy hoffman on June 18, 2026. Posted in Blog.

June 18, 2026

Darknet marketplaces (DNMs) have become one of the defining features of the dark web, enabling anonymous users to buy and sell illicit goods and services beyond the reach of traditional online platforms. Early marketplaces like The Farmer’s Market laid the groundwork, but it was Silk Road that brought global attention to the underground economy operating through anonymized networks such as Tor. Since Silk Road’s takedown by law enforcement in 2013, the DNM ecosystem has remained in constant flux, with competing platforms emerging, collapsing, or disappearing altogether as vendors and buyers migrate in search of stability and security.

In recent years, law enforcement agencies have significantly improved their ability to disrupt and seize DNMs, forcing marketplaces to adapt, else vanish. At the same time, users face growing risks from “exit scams,” where marketplace administrators abruptly shut down operations and abscond with funds held in escrow. This instability has accelerated the rise of more security-conscious platforms that prioritize operational resilience and tighter user vetting.

Modern DNMs typically operate on Tor or similar anonymity-focused networks, using layered trust and security mechanisms to protect both buyers and sellers. Features such as encrypted communications using PGP (Pretty Good Privacy), escrow payment systems, user verification, and rotating mirror domains are designed to reduce exposure and maintain continuity during takedowns. Some platforms have gone further by adopting invite-only models, restricting access to vetted users in an effort to strengthen operational security and avoid infiltration.

DarkBay Marketplace

Darkbay is a darknet marketplace accessible through the Tor network, with a name seemingly designed to mirror the familiarity of the legitimate platform eBay. Like many dark web marketplaces, it connects buyers and vendors involved in the trade of illicit goods and services, including narcotics, stolen financial data, counterfeit documents, malware, and hacking tools. Transactions are typically conducted using cryptocurrencies, while features such as vendor ratings and escrow services help build trust in an otherwise high-risk environment. As with other DNMs, users face significant risks ranging from scams and financial loss to potential law enforcement action. According to DarkOwl’s Vision, we have over 12,534 results pertaining to DarkBay Market. Open-source information reveals versions of the DNM have existed since 2020. Since first collection, activity has remained steady averaging around 500 listings per month, excluding a drastic increase of listings in January 2026. Analysis of the increase in January reveal over 2K listings made by the vendor amazonianstore selling primarily prescription drugs. According to DarkOwl Vision, amazonianstore, is the most active vendor on the site posting over 7K listings.

Figure 1: DarkOwl Vision Graph of DarkBay Market Activity

Figure 2: DarkOwl Vision Top 10 Vendor List for DarkBay Marketplace

Figure 3: DarkOwl Vision Graph Activity for Vendor Amazonianstore

Open-source reporting on the marketplace remains limited. However, a Reddit discussion from January 2020 included multiple users questioning the site’s legitimacy. More recent analysis suggests that vendors primarily operate through associated Telegram channels, which buyers can contact directly. The overall credibility of sellers on the platform remains difficult to verify, and the extent of fraudulent activity is unclear.

Homepage

The below screenshot shows DarkBay’s homepage. Unlike other DNM’s the site does not require you to log in to view “merchandise”. DarkBay’s page layout advertises popular sales, such as drugs and weapons, database leaks, and even a Goldendoodle puppy.

On the left-hand side, the page provides links to specific sales categorizing them as:

Drugs (38,292 Listings)
Electronics (1,101 Listings)
Finance (45,233 Listings)
Hacking (7,898 Listings)
Other (16,612 Listings)

Currently (as of early June, 2026) there is a total of 109,136 product listings. The drugs section currently contains the most product listings, while Miscellaneous contains the fewest listings. The products with the most listings are currently prescriptions (11,063 listings), weapons (10,507 listings), and credit cards (9,992 listings).

Additionally, DarkBay features dedicated “store” pages that highlight individual sellers and present them as verified vendors. These pages allow buyers to browse all products offered by a seller and indicate their experience through a simple thumbs-up or thumbs-down rating system.

Drugs

The drugs section on DarkBay offers a variety of illicit narcotics and prescription drugs (including tobacco products) such as marijuana, MDMA, LSD, and more. Currently (as of early June, 2026) there are a total of 38,292 drug listings on this market. The below displays a preview of these listings:

LSD Pacman 22mcg, $30 USD
MDMA, 10 pills/$40.00 USD
Magic Mushrooms, 30 grams/$90 USD

DarkOwl analysts selected one product (see below screenshots) to further examine. The below product is allegedly “Pure Uncut Heroin 90%” shipped from Germany. According to the description the product is “Pure uncut Afghan heroin” and can ship worldwide. The site does not provide an area for reviews or comments. Since November 2025, DarkOwl Vision shows over 300 listings for “Heroin” from 7 vendors.

Figure 9: DarkOwl Vision Vendor List

Electronics

The Electronics section on DarkBay features a wide range of illicitly sold devices, including smartphones, computers, smartwatches, and other consumer electronics. Among the available categories, the computers section contains the highest number of listings, totaling approximately 428 active posts. In addition to hardware sales, vendors also advertise cyber-related services such as social media account hacking, as well as fraudulent documents including fake driver’s licenses and passports.

A significant portion of the smartphones listed for sale — including both Apple and Android devices — are offered by vendors identified as “verified sellers” on the platform, suggesting an established reputation within the marketplace. The prevalence of verified accounts may contribute to increased buyer trust and the continued growth of illegal electronic commerce on the site.

Finance

The Finance section offers “Counterfeits, Credit Cards, Cryptocurrency, Gift Cards, PayPal, and Transfers” with counterfeits and credit cards containing the highest number of results. The section’s homepage prominently showcases counterfeit currency and fraudulent credit card offerings, indicating that these products constitute a significant portion of the marketplace’s financial activity.

After reviewing the counterfeit cash offerings, analysts identified a significant volume of sales linked to the verified seller, DigitalPrint. The vendor advertises counterfeit currency from multiple countries and claims to operate out of the United States. In promotional posts, the seller states they “take care of every detail: watermarks, serial numbers, paper type, color-shifting inks, security threads, 3D security ribbons and that makes it extremely hard to distinguish our fake notes from real ones even with UV detectors.” They also caution buyers against depositing the counterfeit currency into banks.

A review of the credit cards for sale indicates that many of the listings claim to include preloaded spending limits. This section appears to contain a higher number of random, unverified sellers compared to the counterfeit documents section. In the example below, a seller advertises an American Express card with a purported $4,500 limit for $450 USD. The listing also states that the card includes a PIN and cash withdrawal instructions.

Hacking

The Hacking section offers a range of illicit “products,” including database leaks and services claiming to provide unauthorized access to email and social media accounts. This includes alleged “pre-built” malware that buyers can purchase and use to infect machines of their choosing.

Due to the absence of review or feedback mechanisms on the site, the credibility and effectiveness of these sellers’ claimed hacking capabilities cannot be verified. Although sellers rarely disclose how the information was obtained, it is likely that at least some of the account data originates from prior database breaches or leaked credential collections.

Other

The “Other” category includes a variety of miscellaneous sale sections, such as COVID-19 items, gambling services, passports, vehicles, and weapons. Among these, weapons account for the largest volume of listings, with a total of 10,507 sales. Another notably active section is passports, where buyers can obtain counterfeit identification documents, including Social Security numbers.

Open-source information revealed a 2021 publication from the National Library of Medicine (NLM) that referenced the sale of COVID-19-related materials on DNMs prior to the availability of legitimate vaccines. The publication specifically identified DarkBay marketplace as hosting the majority of COVID-19-related listings, with personal protective equipment (PPE) being the most frequently advertised product category. The chart below presents NLM’s findings on COVID-19–related listings across DarkBay compared with other analyzed marketplaces, showing a significantly higher number of such listings on DarkBay.

Figure 16: https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7819623/

Analyst review of the current COVID-19 section found that most listings now appear to involve illegal prescription drug sales, representing a shift from the activity observed in 2021. The reason these prescription drug listings remain categorized under the COVID-19 section is unclear.

Conclusion

While DarkBay appears to lack the legitimacy and reputation of more established DNMs, many buyers are still drawn to them because they offer products at lower prices. Its rise in prominence reflects the disruption caused by the shutdown of major marketplaces such as Silk Road seizure and AlphaBay shutdown. Although the legitimacy of vendors and listings on these platforms is often uncertain, the products advertised are typically in high demand among individuals seeking illicit goods. As a result, transactions continue to occur on these sites regardless of concerns about their credibility or authenticity.

Curious to learn more about darknet monitoring? Contact us.

What are Man-in-the-Middle Attacks?

Written by DarkOwl Content Team on June 16, 2026. Posted in Blog.

June 18, 2026

Cybersecurity might as well have its own language. There are so many acronyms, terms, sayings that cybersecurity professionals and threat actors both use that unless you are deeply knowledgeable, have experience in the security field or have a keen interest, one may not know. Understanding what these acronyms and terms mean is the first step to developing a thorough understanding of cybersecurity and in turn better protecting yourself, clients, and employees.

In this blog series, we aim to explain and simplify some of the most commonly used terms. Previously, we have covered bullet proof hosting, CVEs, APIs, brute force attacks, zero-day exploits, doxing, data harvesting, IoCs, credential stuffing, ransomware as a service, push bombing, web application attacks. In this edition, we dive into man-in-the-middle attacks.

While the concept itself is straightforward, the digital execution can be incredibly sophisticated. Let’s explore what a man-in-the-middle attack is, how threat actors pull it off, and how you can protect your data from being intercepted.

Quick Stats to Set the Scene

Man-in-the-middle attacks may not generate the same headlines as ransomware or major data breaches, but they remain a significant threat across the cybercrime ecosystem. These statistics highlight a simple reality: while many organizations focus on attacks against endpoints and applications, data in transit remains a highly valuable target for cybercriminals.

Industry reports suggest nearly 58% of all posts on criminal forums and marketplaces contain banking data of others collected by MITM or other attack types.
Estimates show that 35% of exploitation activity involves man-in-the-middle attacks.
MITM attacks continue to evolve alongside cloud adoption, mobile devices, and remote work environments, creating new opportunities for attackers to intercept sensitive communications.

Man-in-the-Middle Attacks 101

A Man-in-the-Middle Attack (MitM) is an attack that compromises the communication between the two parties who believe that they are communicating directly with each other. Instead of data moving directly from a user to a website, application, or service, the attacker inserts themselves into the connection to observe, steal, or manipulate information being transmitted, placing themselves “in the middle.”

The goal of an MitM attack is to compromise the CIA Triad, specifically violating confidentiality (by reading private data) and integrity (by altering the data in transit). Threat actors use these attacks to steal credentials, account details, credit card numbers, to inject malware into a victim’s system, or to create a smokescreen for an advanced attack. Depending on the technique used, victims may never realize their traffic was compromised.

Confidentiality: is your sensitive information only accessible to those authorized to see it?
- Common Threats: phishing, ma-in-the-middle attacks, human error
Integrity: is your data authentic, accurate, and reliable?
- Common Threats: man-in-the-middle attacks, human error, malware, hardware/software glitches

When you type a web address into your browser, your device trusts the local network to direct it to the correct destination. Threat actors exploit this trust using a couple of distinct phases: Interception and Decryption.

First, the attacker must get between the victim and their network destination. This can happen through compromised Wi-Fi networks, malicious routers, spoofed websites, DNS manipulation, or malware infections. Public Wi-Fi networks are a common target because users often connect without verifying the legitimacy or security of the network. Once traffic passes through the attacker-controlled system, the threat actor can monitor the communication in real time. After gaining access to credentials, cookies, or authentication tokens, attackers may impersonate the victim and gain unauthorized access to accounts or systems.

Common Types of Man-in-the-Middle Attacks

ARP Spoofing: Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) links IP addresses to physical MAC addresses on a local network. An attacker sends fake ARP messages to link their own MAC address with a legitimate server’s IP address. Suddenly, all data meant for the server goes to the attacker first.

Wi-Fi Eavesdropping / Rogue Access Points: An attacker sets up a malicious, free public Wi-Fi network with a common name (like “Free Airport Wi-Fi”). When a user connects, the attacker can view all unencrypted traffic flowing through the router.

DNS Spoofing (DNS Cache Poisoning): Attackers alter a DNS server or a device’s local cache to route a user to a fraudulent website that looks identical to a legitimate one (like a banking portal), allowing them to steal credentials.

Session Hijacking: Attackers steal session cookies or authentication tokens to impersonate legitimate users without needing their password.

SSL Stripping: SSL stripping downgrades secure HTTPS connections to unencrypted HTTP communications. This enables attackers to intercept information that users assume is encrypted.

Man in the Middle Attacks in the Wild

Public Wi-Fi Credential Theft

While individual incidents often go unreported, cybersecurity firms routinely observe threat actors creating fake Wi-Fi networks that mimic legitimate hotel, airport, and conference, coffee shop wireless networks. Unsuspecting users connect to these networks and unknowingly expose login credentials, emails, and sensitive corporate traffic. These attacks remain one of the most common real-world examples of man-in-the-middle activity because they require relatively little sophistication and can affect large numbers of victims.

MyEtherWallet BGP Hijacking (2018)

In 2018, attackers hijacked internet routing to redirect users attempting to access MyEtherWallet. Victims were presented with a fraudulent SSL certificate and redirected to attacker-controlled infrastructure, allowing credentials and wallet information to be captured. The incident resulted in the theft of cryptocurrency and demonstrated how internet infrastructure attacks can facilitate man-in-the-middle operations.

Iranian Cyber-Espionage Campaign Using Fraudulent SSL Certificates (2011)

In 2011, attackers compromised Dutch certificate authority DigiNotar and generated fraudulent SSL certificates for domains including Google. Security researchers and Google reported that the certificates were used in man-in-the-middle attacks targeting users in Iran, allowing attackers to intercept supposedly secure communications such as Gmail traffic. Investigators later estimated that as many as 300,000 Iranian users may have been affected, making it one of the most significant documented MitM attacks ever discovered.

Protection and Mitigation

The common thread across MitM is trust: attackers succeed when they can convince victims—or their devices—that malicious communications are legitimate. Organizations and individuals can significantly reduce risk by following security best practices:

Use HTTPS: Always verify websites use HTTPS encryption. Modern browsers warn users about insecure connections, but users should still validate certificates and domains before entering credentials.
Avoid Untrusted Public Wi-Fi: Public wireless networks increase exposure to interception attacks. If you must use public Wi-Fi, always use a reputable Virtual Private Network (VPN) to securely tunnel and encrypt your traffic.
Implement Strong Wi-Fi Security: Ensure your home and office networks use strong encryption protocols (like WPA3) and change default router admin credentials immediately.
Enable Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA): Even if an attacker steals login credentials via an MitM attack, MFA acts as an extra layer of defense, making it much harder for them to gain access.
Keep Systems Updated: Security patches help close vulnerabilities attackers may exploit to conduct interception or session hijacking attacks.
Use VPNs: Virtual Private Networks encrypt internet traffic and reduce the risk of traffic interception on untrusted networks.
Monitor for Suspicious Network Activity: Organizations should implement network monitoring and anomaly detection to identify unauthorized devices, DNS changes, or unusual traffic patterns.
Implement Endpoint Protection: Ensure your corporate devices utilize robust endpoint detection software capable of identifying network anomalies, rogue certificates, and localized ARP spoofing attempts.
Train Employees on Phishing and Network Security: Many MitM attacks begin with social engineering or fake infrastructure designed to appear trustworthy. Security awareness training helps reduce successful compromises.

Security is a holistic culture, not just a software update. By understanding how threat actors operate and protecting both the physical and digital layers of your defense, you can ensure your data remains confidential, secure, and out of the middle.

Curious to learn more about dark web monitoring? Contact us.

What Darknet Markets Actually Look Like From the Inside

Written by kathy hoffman on June 11, 2026. Posted in Blog.

June 11, 2026

Across 53 darknet marketplaces actively observed between January and April 2026, DarkOwl collected new listings spanning more than 3,200 unique category labels. That fragmentation is not an accident — markets and vendors invent categories independently, which means a listing for methamphetamine might be filed under “Stimulants,” “RC Chems,” “Speed,” “Uppers,” or something else entirely depending on where it’s posted.

Making sense of that data requires moving past the labels. Rather than treating market-defined categories as meaningful, DarkOwl normalizes every listing into a consistent framework, then aggregates those normalized categories to produce a fingerprint: a profile of what a market actually hosts, expressed as a distribution across standardized categories.

When you compare those fingerprints across the 53 markets active in Q1 2026, five structural groupings emerge. Below, we take a look at these findings.

Five Kinds of Darknet Markets

First Cluster: Fraud-Dominant Markets

Avalon, Crown Market, and Courier Market group together because financial fraud, identity documents, and stolen credentials dominate their listing mix — not drugs. Sklad Market, Mist Market, and Apocalypse Market form a related sub-cluster, where fraud remains primary but is accompanied by a substantial hacking and cybersecurity presence. None of these markets are necessarily known by reputation as fraud platforms, but their listing distributions are unambiguous.

Second Cluster: Mixed-Activity Markets

Nexus Market, Atlas Market, Prime, and We-The-North maintain roughly balanced distributions across drugs, fraud, hacking tools, and compromised accounts. No single category dominates. Shadow-X occupies this cluster but stands out within it — it carries a notable share of luxury goods that distinguishes its profile from its peers. Anubis Market and Venom are grouped nearby, differentiated by a higher concentration of weapons listings alongside drugs.

Third Cluster: Cannabis-Focused Markets

Smokersco, CannaExpress, Drug-Town, and Trading-Market-Exchange group together not because they’re small or inactive but because their category distributions are so concentrated. These platforms sell almost exclusively cannabis — sometimes 85–90% of all listings fall into a single subcategory. Fingerprinting separates them from the broader drug markets precisely because their specialization is so pronounced. A platform that’s 90% cannabis looks nothing like a platform that’s 70% drugs across stimulants, opioids, psychedelics, and other classes.

Fourth Cluster: Broad Drug Markets

Omg-omg, TorZon, Blacksprut, Cocorico, and Vortex Market group here — drug listings dominate at 70–80%, with fraud and hacking as secondary categories. These are the markets the ecosystem knows by reputation, and their fingerprints confirm it.

Fifth Cluster: Atypical Outliers

Zelenka-LolzTeam hosts almost nothing but gaming accounts and social media profiles — its fingerprint bears no resemblance to any other market in the dataset. RoiBusiness and Ares are drug-focused but have low enough listing volumes that they remain separate from the main drug cluster, making cross-market comparison unreliable without accounting for scale.

Markets Don’t Stay Still

The cluster analysis reflects a four-month average, which obscures something important: several markets changed their category composition significantly over the period. Some changes are consistent with normal variation — different vendors posting different volumes in different months. Others are not.

Stargate Market is the clearest example. January listings are dominated by adult content — the platform looks, at first glance, like a niche adult market. By February the adult content has largely disappeared, replaced by drugs and fraud. March shifts again to cannabis and services. By April, financial accounts, identity fraud, and hacking tools dominate, and drug listings have almost vanished. Over four months, Stargate cycled through four structurally different profiles.

Avalon shows a different trajectory. January is drug-dominant. February brings a sharp increase in fraud. March sees reduced volume with a higher proportion of hacking and cybersecurity. By April, volume is significantly lower, and remaining listings are primarily fraud. The arc is consistent with a platform losing its drug vendor base — through enforcement action, vendor migration, or market reputation decline — with fraud listings filling the remaining activity.

Shadow-X begins the period with a distinctive luxury goods presence that places it as an outlier within the mixed cluster. That distinguishing feature disappears by April, replaced by the drugs-and-fraud profile that characterizes most of its neighbors. Whatever made Shadow-X distinctive in January was gone by Q2.

DarkHub shows the opposite pattern: category composition stays relatively consistent across all four months, but listing volume drops sharply in March and April. The mix doesn’t change — drugs and fraud, roughly stable proportions — but the platform is generating far fewer new listings. That’s a different kind of signal: not a change in what’s being sold, but a contraction in who’s selling it.

What this Means for Tracking Markets

Market reputation — what a platform is known for in forums, reviews, or community discussion — is a lagging and often inaccurate indicator of what’s actually being sold. Avalon does not carry a reputation as a fraud market. Its January data wouldn’t suggest one. Its April data is almost entirely fraud. An investigator relying on reputation-based targeting would have the wrong picture of Avalon for much of the year.

The cluster analysis and temporal tracking together point toward a more reliable approach: compare what a market is really hosting, using normalized categories, against the broader ecosystem. Markets that appear structurally similar to known fraud-dominant platforms are worth treating as fraud-dominant platforms, regardless of what they’re called or how they’re marketed. Markets whose category composition is shifting toward fraud or hacking-focused activity are worth monitoring more closely, because that shift is often a precursor to vendor migration, enforcement attention, or platform collapse.

When a market does collapse — as happens regularly in darknet ecosystems — its vendor population redistributes. Fingerprinting the collapsed market makes it possible to track that redistribution: look for increases in specific category clusters on other active platforms in the weeks following shutdown. The category signal persists after the market name disappears.

Analysis based on DarkOwl’s DarkMart dataset, covering 53 active markets and new listings observed from January through April 2026. Category distributions are derived from DarkOwl’s normalized category framework, applied uniformly across all markets including listings without market-defined categories.

Curious how DarkOwl can do deeper analysis for your company? Contact us.

The Attack Was the Message: The DOJ Indictment and the Operational Model Behind HAYI

Written by kathy hoffman on June 9, 2026. Posted in Blog.

June 9, 2026

On May 28, 2026, the U.S. Department of Justice unsealed an eight-count indictment against Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood Al-Saadi, a dual Iranian-Iraqi national charged with terrorism-related offenses for his alleged role as a senior operative of Kata’ib Hezbollah and Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The indictment covers nearly 20 attacks and attempted attacks across Europe and the United States, all carried out in the name of Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI), a group that first emerged publicly in March 2026.

Figure 1: HAYI logo and branding; Source: Foundation for Defense or Democracies

The legal case matters on its own terms. But the more analytically interesting question is what the indictment reveals about how HAYI functioned: not as a standalone terrorist organization, but as a coordinated media-and-operations network allegedly directed by Iranian-aligned actors. DarkOwl began monitoring HAYI’s Telegram footprint in April 2026. Mapping that monitoring against the indictment’s allegations puts several patterns that were already observable at the time into a different light.

Analysis for this blog was conducted using DarkOwl Vision, through targeted tracking of Telegram channels associated with HAYI and the broader Iranian-aligned amplification network.

Who Is Al-Saadi?

Al-Saadi, 32, is a dual Iranian-Iraqi national with a career spanning more than a decade inside IRGC-aligned militia networks. According to the DOJ and a detailed CTC Sentinel profile published in May 2026 by Crispin Smith and Michael Knights of the Militia Spotlight platform, he reportedly fought in Syria around 2016 in support of Assad’s forces and returned to Iraq to participate in operations against the Islamic State. Open-source imagery from as early as 2015 shows him operating alongside Iraqi Shia Popular Mobilization Forces and, unusually for someone his age, photographed repeatedly with senior IRGC-Quds Force and militia leadership including Qassem Soleimani.

After his arrest, Al-Saadi waived his Miranda rights and spoke voluntarily to U.S. law enforcement. He described himself as a leader within “the resistance,” a term he used to refer to the IRGC, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. He said he had been like a son to Soleimani and traveled with him constantly before Soleimani was killed in a U.S. airstrike in January 2020. He also stated he met with Iran’s then-Supreme Leader Khamenei approximately three days before the conflict with Iran began in February 2026.

The CTC authors describe his career as reflecting “rarified trust and access” within Iranian-aligned militant structures. That background matters for understanding how someone allegedly coordinated a multi-country attack-and-media campaign while based in Iraq.

The Indictment: A Coordinated Attack-and-Media System

The DOJ alleges Al-Saadi played a significant role in planning, coordinating, and amplifying approximately 18 attacks across Europe conducted in HAYI’s name, including arson attacks, rudimentary bombings, stabbings, and a claimed drone operation targeting the Israeli Embassy in London. Two additional attacks in Canada are also alleged. Prosecutors describe HAYI as “actually a front of Kata’ib Hizballah and other U.S. designated foreign terrorist organizations.”

This is not a standard material support case. The allegations describe a level of operational integration between the attacks themselves and the surrounding media operations that goes well beyond financing or inspiration from a distance. According to prosecutors, Al-Saadi participated in live FaceTime calls with attackers while operations were underway, recorded those attacks, helped produce propaganda videos, and coordinated dissemination in parallel with the attacks themselves.

A video from April 18, 2026, the day of an attack against a synagogue in London, shows Al-Saadi on a FaceTime call projected onto a large screen against the HAYI logo, recording the attack as it happened. A voice on the call directs the attacker to “take a lighter,” “light it,” and “throw the fourth one.”

After his arrest, Al-Saadi told U.S. law enforcement he was “in charge of media and psychological warfare, including against the United States, as well as strategy and military intelligence.” He said HAYI’s propaganda videos were part of the “psychological warfare” the resistance was waging against the United States, designed to “instill fear and terror in civilians.”

His instructions to a Kata’ib Hezbollah contact about distributing attack footage reflect the same logic. In one exchange cited in the indictment, Al-Saadi told the contact that “[t]he most important thing is that within the psychological warfare, they [HAYI’s messages] are useful,” and that “anything that distracts the enemy is useful.”

Figure 2: Arrested senior officer of Kata’ib Hezbollah (December 2019 Facebook post accusing al-Saadi of assassination against protesters, reposting an image shared by al-Saadi himself in May 2018); Source: CTC West Point

The U.S. Targeting Dimension

Most public attention has focused on the European attack campaign, but the indictment also documents Al-Saadi’s alleged efforts to bring the campaign to the United States.

Prosecutors allege that in March and April 2026, Al-Saadi worked to arrange attacks in the United States, including against a synagogue in New York City. On April 30, 2026, the day before his detention while traveling in Turkey, he called an individual in the United States and asked whether that person knew “someone who could ‘attack’ in the United States, including by ‘burning, . . . or whatever he can,’ including ‘killing.’” He was detained the next day.

That attempted expansion fits with what Al-Saadi told investigators about his broader objectives. He described “the resistance” as waging psychological warfare specifically against the United States, and the geographic scope of HAYI’s claimed attacks had been moving steadily from Europe toward North America over the course of the operation.

What DarkOwl Observed in Parallel Telegram Activity

DarkOwl began monitoring HAYI-linked activity in April 2026 as attack claims circulated across Telegram. Our April 16 analysis raised the question of whether HAYI was a distinct organization or a node within a broader network. Several findings from that monitoring connect directly to what the indictment now alleges.

Al Faqaar as a structured amplification node. DarkOwl identified the Al Faqaar Telegram channel as consistently publishing HAYI-attributed content before or alongside the group’s own channels. At the time, we noted it functioned “similarly to established IRGC-aligned media outlets such as Sabereen News, acting as an early dissemination node.” The indictment now alleges that Al-Saadi instructed his Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) contact to post attack footage “in the news, important” and coordinated directly on which channels to use and when. The distribution pattern DarkOwl tracked was not organic reposting. It fits the picture of structured, upstream direction.
The Sabereen News watermark. Our April 16 analysis also found Sabereen News branding within video content reposted by HAYI-affiliated channels, pointing to “participation in a shared media pipeline where content is reused and redistributed across channels.” The indictment’s allegations about Al-Saadi coordinating directly with KH propagandists on media timing and channel selection offer a plausible account of how that pipeline worked.
April 29, London. In our April 29 post, DarkOwl documented Al Faqaar’s near-real-time coverage of the London stabbing of two Jewish men, including a dual U.S.-British citizen. Al Faqaar published a text-only alert at 0500 MST, followed by attack footage, arrest footage, and a final branded video by 0830 MST. We noted at the time that the speed and structure of the media response suggested the incident was “either anticipated or quickly incorporated into a broader narrative framework.” The indictment shows what was allegedly happening on the other end: that same day, Al-Saadi told his KH contact to post the attack footage (“post it in the news, important”) and sent a message about a planned restaurant shooting for that evening. He was detained the following morning. DarkOwl was tracking the media operation in near-real time while Al-Saadi was allegedly running it.
A note on Russian-linked amplification. DarkOwl’s monitoring of the Axis of Resistance channel network identified that two of the four primary Telegram channels distributing HAYI content appear to have ties to sanctioned Russian networks. Whether this reflects deliberate coordination between Iranian and Russian information operations infrastructure, or parallel amplification by actors pursuing compatible objectives, remains an open question. It is a thread that warrants continued monitoring given the broader context of Iranian-Russian strategic convergence since February 2022.
The “lone wolves” framing reconsidered. The April 29 analysis noted that the final video from the London stabbing framed the attackers as “lone wolves” and observed that this language “may reflect a deliberate strategy that allows groups to claim or amplify attacks while maintaining plausible deniability.” The indictment supports that reading. According to prosecutors, the deniability language in HAYI’s public messaging ran alongside direct tactical coordination, including real-time FaceTime calls during attacks. The two were not in tension. They were apparently by design.

HAYI as a Facade Operation

The analysis in CTC Sentinel characterizes HAYI as bearing “all the hallmarks of a muqawama ‘façade group’ operation, in which an online brand is used to partially conceal the real-world identity of an Iranian-aligned attacker.” The authors document that Al-Saadi sent HAYI’s launch statement and associated iconography via his Snapchat account more than four hours before it circulated publicly, indicating, as they put it, “his advanced and insider knowledge of HAYI’s operations.”

That finding tracks with what DarkOwl observed. In our April 16 analysis, we described HAYI as “best understood as part of a broader ecosystem in which content is circulated, repurposed, and reinforced across multiple actors” and noted that “attribution becomes less about identifying a single origin point and more about understanding how narratives move across channels.” HAYI’s primary Telegram channel was removed or banned by early April, but content continued moving through Al Faqaar, Safee al-Deen, and affiliated channels. The indictment suggests that continuity was structural from the beginning, with centralized direction continuing regardless of which channel was carrying the content at any given time.

HAYI was not, according to prosecutors, a spontaneous movement that KH later amplified. The branding, messaging, and distribution were managed upstream from the start.

The Operational Model: Attacks and Propaganda as a Single System

In Al-Saadi’s own account, as alleged by prosecutors, propaganda was not something that happened after an attack. It was part of the attack. “Psychological warfare” was described as a strategic objective, sitting alongside kinetic operations. Attack footage was reviewed, curated, timed, and sent to specific channels. The same person allegedly directing FaceTime calls during attacks was also coordinating which Telegram accounts received the footage and when.

The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) has characterized this type of approach as consistent with a potential “violence as a service” model, where individuals may be recruited, inspired, or financially incentivized to conduct attacks that are then amplified through a broader media network. The DOJ allegations add specificity to that framework: recruitment of local criminals (frequently minors, according to court documents, with at least one recruit offered €600 via Snapchat), real-time tactical coordination via video call, payments made via cryptocurrency and ZainCash, and propaganda production and distribution run through the same command structure as the attacks themselves.

This creates real problems for attribution and disruption. A decentralized channel network built around a disposable front brand lets organizing actors benefit from the psychological effects of violence while keeping distance from the individuals carrying out attacks. The deniability framing visible in HAYI’s public messaging was not a gap in the model. According to the indictment’s allegations, it was part of the design.

Implications for Threat Intelligence Analysis

Tracking the amplification network matters as much as tracking the primary brand. HAYI’s own channel was banned in early April. Its operational footprint stayed visible through Al Faqaar, Safee al-Deen, Sabereen News, and affiliated channels. In this model, monitoring the distribution layer is as important as monitoring the group itself.
Rapid media response can be a signal, not just noise. HAYI’s near-real-time output after attacks could be read as unsophisticated or opportunistic. The indictment points in the other direction: that speed reflected upstream coordination.
The “Lone wolf” framing should be treated as a narrative choice, not an analytical conclusion. The deniability language in HAYI’s messaging was visible before the indictment. Prosecutors now allege it ran alongside direct tactical direction of attacks in real time.
Propaganda channels and attack planning may share a command structure. Al-Saadi is alleged to have managed both simultaneously. Monitoring media production and distribution may provide as much operationally relevant signal as monitoring attack planning activity directly.
The model is transferable. Front branding, recruited or inspired attackers, real-time coordination, and rapid media amplification require fewer resources and expose fewer operatives than traditional terrorist infrastructure, while potentially generating outsized psychological impact. If it continues to prove effective, other actors are likely to adopt it.

Conclusion

The indictment offers a rare look inside a structure where violence and media amplification were apparently run as a single operation. The question it raises is not just who carried out a given attack, but how the surrounding channel network was built to turn that violence into narrative impact.

Much of what the indictment now alleges as fact was already partially visible in HAYI’s Telegram footprint: in Al Faqaar’s distribution patterns, in the Sabereen News watermarks embedded in attack footage, in the speed and coherence of the media response to the London stabbing on April 29. The indictment adds prosecutorial detail to patterns that DarkOwl’s monitoring had already flagged.

Recent academic research on HAYI, including work cited by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, has drawn on DarkOwl’s prior analysis of the group’s Telegram footprint and its relationship to the broader Iranian-aligned network. The Al-Saadi case makes clear why that kind of monitoring matters, and why the channel networks surrounding these operations deserve as much analytical attention as the operations themselves.

DarkOwl continues to monitor how this model evolves and whether it inspires adoption by other state-aligned actors or extremist networks. The case against Al-Saadi is one data point in what may be a longer trend toward operational structures that treat media amplification and physical violence as inseparable. How other groups respond to that example, and whether the model proves durable after a high-profile arrest, will be worth watching closely.

External Sources

U.S. Department of Justice, SDNY. Dual Iranian-Iraqi National Indicted For Providing Material Support To Terrorist Organizations. May 28, 2026.

Smith, Crispin and Michael Knights. Mohammad Baqer al-Saadi: Profiling an IRGC and Iraqi Militia Operative. CTC Sentinel, May 2026.

Fiennes, Guy. Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right: The ‘Gig-Economy’ Proxy Group Attacking Europe. ISD Digital Dispatch, April 30, 2026 (updated May 15, 2026).

Check out our other recent blogs on Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia and Handala.

Darknet Market Vendor Analysis

Written by kathy hoffman on June 3, 2026. Posted in Blog.

What vendor behavior actually looks like across 7,314 sellers — and why the same name on eleven markets doesn’t mean what you’d expect.

June 03, 2026

Of the 7,314 vendors active on darknet markets between January and April 2026, more than 2,000 posted exactly one listing. Another 1,000+ posted only two. The distribution has a long tail: the vast majority of accounts are transient, low-volume, and individually uninformative. They appear and disappear without accumulating enough activity to characterize.

This is the baseline condition of darknet vendor data. Most of it is noise. What’s operationally useful is concentrated in a smaller population of high-activity sellers whose behavior is sustained enough to analyze — and whose patterns persist across migrations, rebranding, and platform shifts.

Among the 285 vendors who posted more than 50 new listings during the period, two findings stand out.

Drug Vendors Specialize. Fraud Vendors Diversify.

The first finding is about specialization. Drug vendors, in aggregate, are more narrowly focused than any other vendor category. Cannabis sellers are the extreme case: most concentrate 90% or more of their activity in cannabis listings, with almost nothing else. Stimulant specialists and opioid specialists are nearly as concentrated — a vendor who sells stimulants rarely sells psychedelics or opioids at meaningful volume, even within the broader drug category.

This pattern is analytically useful. A cannabis vendor with 200 listings is maximally exposed in a single product category. Their profile is easy to recognize, easy to track across platforms, and easy to distinguish from vendors who happen to have a few cannabis listings alongside other inventory.

Broad-spectrum drug vendors — those distributing activity across stimulants, opioids, psychedelics, and other subcategories — exist but are less common. When they appear, the diversity itself is a signal. Vendors who source across multiple drug classes typically operate at larger scale or have more diversified supply chains than single-substance specialists.

Fraud vendors look structurally different. The typical high-activity fraud vendor spreads across financial instruments, identity documents, compromised accounts, and sometimes hacking tools within the same portfolio. This breadth is consistent with organized operations that source across multiple pipelines — not a single individual with a specific product, but a coordinated set of supply relationships. An investigator treating a fraud vendor the same way as a drug vendor — looking for a narrow category concentration — will misread the profile.

The Username Problem

The second finding concerns identity. Darknet vendors routinely reuse usernames across platforms, and other vendors independently register identical names on markets where those names aren’t taken. The result is that a username, on its own, is an ambiguous identifier.

The username victorviran appears on eleven markets during the January–April period. It’s an instructive example because the behavioral divergence across those eleven accounts is stark.

Three of the accounts — on WarpZone, Atlas Market, and Nexus Market — show nearly identical fingerprints: almost entirely accounts and credentials, with minimal activity in other categories. The structural similarity across platforms is too close to be coincidental. These accounts are plausibly the same operator maintaining parallel presence on multiple markets. The Stargate account bearing the same name has expanded its profile to include hacking tools alongside credentials — either an evolution of the same operation or a closely related actor.

Then there are accounts with the same name selling primarily financial fraud, with no meaningful overlap with the credentials-focused accounts. And at least one victorviran account whose listings are drugs. The profile bears no resemblance to the others.

The inverse of this problem is equally significant, and in some ways more useful to investigators. Different vendors operating under different names can produce nearly identical fingerprints — the same category distribution, the same subcategory emphasis, similar listing volumes. When a vendor migrates from a collapsed market to a new platform under a new username, the fingerprint often follows.

This is where similarity search across markets becomes operationally relevant. Starting from a known vendor profile — say, a confirmed drug distributor on a market that has since shut down — you can compute fingerprint similarity across all vendors on currently active markets and surface accounts whose behavioral profiles closely match. The name is different. The behavior is not.

In the victorviran similarity network, the most closely matching profiles include accounts that share the username. But they also include accounts that don’t. The fingerprint search finds both, and the username search alone would miss the latter entirely.

What Vendor Fingerprints Actually Tell You

The operational framing matters here. Fingerprints are a similarity signal, not an attribution mechanism. Two vendors with identical category distributions are not necessarily the same person. But vendors with highly similar fingerprints, appearing on different platforms in overlapping time windows, are worth treating as related until evidence suggests otherwise. The alternative — treating every new username as a new actor — understates continuity in an ecosystem where continuity is deliberately obscured.

The specialization patterns matter too. A vendor who is 95% cannabis is not a general drug distributor who happens to sell cannabis. They’re a cannabis-specific operator, and their investigative profile should reflect that. A fraud vendor who combines identity documents, financial instruments, and hacking tools in a single portfolio is not an opportunistic individual seller — the breadth implies supply chain access that a single person doesn’t typically have.

Seven thousand vendors is too many to work through manually. Fingerprint-based clustering reduces that population to meaningful groups: the cannabis specialists who cluster together by behavior, the credentials vendors who look similar across platforms, the broad-spectrum fraud operations that stand apart from everything else. The 285 high-activity vendors are not representative of the 7,314 — they’re a different kind of actor and analyzing them as a separate population surfaces patterns that the full dataset obscures.

Analysis based on DarkOwl’s DarkMart dataset, covering 7,314 active vendors across 53 markets from January through April 2026. Vendor fingerprints are derived from normalized category distributions across all listings associated with each vendor during the period. High-activity vendors are defined as those with 50 or more new listings during the observation window.

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Threat Intelligence RoundUp: May

Written by DarkOwl Content Team on June 1, 2026. Posted in Blog.

June 01, 2026

Our analyst team shares a few articles each week in our email newsletter which goes every Thursday. Make sure to register! This blog highlights those articles in order of what was the most popular in our newsletter – what our readers found the most intriguing. Stay tuned for a recap every month. We hope sharing these resources and news articles emphasizes the importance of cybersecurity and sheds light on the latest in threat intelligence.

1. Instructure hacker claims data theft from 8,800 schools, universities – Bleeping Computer

New posts on ShinyHunters data leak site reveal the threat group allegedly has breached the education technology company Instructure. The group has claimed to have stolen 280 million records connected to students and staff from over 8K colleges, school districts, and online education platforms. Using Canvas data export feature ShinyHunters was able to harvest “hundreds of gigabytes of user records, messages, and enrollment data”. According to the data leak site, ShinyHunters extended their deadline until May 12, claiming some of the affected institutions were engaging with the group. Read full article.

2. 15-year-old detained over French govt agency data breach – Bleeping Computer

French authorities have detained a 15-year-old suspect in connection to the cyberattack on France Titres (ANTS). Using the alias “breach3d”, the suspect was selling between 12 to 18 million records stolen from the ANTS data breach. The minor faces charges for “unauthorized access, persistence, and data exfiltration from a state-run automated personal data processing system, as well as for possession of software that enables the offenses.” These charges carry a maximum sentence of 7 years in prison and a fine of 300K euros. Article here.

3. ShinyHunters Lists New Victims Including Zara, 7-Eleven, and Pitney Bowes in Alleged Data Release – breachnews

On April 22, ShinyHunters released data belonging to multiple organizations including Carnival Corporation, Zara, 7-Eleven, Pitney Bowes, and more. Several of the organizations are associated with the groups previous compromise of Salesforce environments. The site claims each company “failed to reach an agreement” leading to ShinyHunters releasing their data. The datasets are said to include a combination of personally identifiable information, transaction records, and internal corporate data. In multiple instances, ShinyHunters highlighted Salesforce-related records, reinforcing a pattern seen in earlier campaigns linked to misconfigured cloud environments. Read more here.

4. Fake OpenAI repository on Hugging Face pushes infostealer malware – Bleeping Computer

A repository that briefly reached #1 on Hugging Face platform was found delivering information-stealing malware to Windows users. “The repository had typosquatted OpenAI’s legitimate Privacy Filter release, copied its model card nearly verbatim, and shipped a loader.py file that fetches and executes infostealer malware on Windows machines,” states HiddenLayer’s Research Team. The ‘loader.py’ script was designed to look innocent, but behind the scenes, it bypassed security checks, contacted a hidden external server, and ran unauthorized commands on the system. The repository was downloaded over 200K times before being removed. Read here.

5. China-Linked Hackers Target Asian Governments, NATO State, Journalists, and Activists – The Hacker News

China-linked hackers have conducted an espionage campaign against government and defense sectors in South, East, and Southeast Asia, as well as a European NATO member. Sharing network overlap with CL-STA-0049, Earth Alux, and REF7707, the threat cluster is being tracked as “SHADOW-EARTH-053”. This group takes advantage of known, already-patched vulnerabilities in internet-facing Microsoft Exchange and IIS servers to gain initial access. Once inside, they install web shells (GODZILLA) to maintain control over the system. They then deploy more advanced malware, such as ShadowPad, using DLL sideloading techniques that hide malicious code inside legitimate, signed programs. Learn more.

6. GlassWorm malware attacks return via 73 OpenVSX “sleeper” extensions – Bleeping Computer

The Glassworm campaign has begun targeting the OpenVSX ecosystem with 73 “sleeper” extensions that become “malicious after an update”. Socket researchers claim 6 of the extensions have been activated and deliver malware, with the other 67 are currently dormant. The latest wave indicates a shift in the attacker’s approach. Instead of embedding malicious code directly within extensions, they first submit seemingly harmless versions to a single ecosystem, then introduce the malicious payload in a later update. Socket also found that the 73 extensions involved in the most recent GlassWorm campaign are clones of legitimate listings, intended to deceive developers who rely primarily on visual cues rather than closely examining the details. Read full article.

7. Azerbaijani Energy Firm Hit by Repeated Microsoft Exchange Exploitation – The Hacker News

FamousSparrow, a Chinese affiliate threat group, has been linked to a “multi-wave intrusion” targeting an Azerbaijani oil and gas company from December 2025 to February 2026. Leveraging a vulnerable Microsoft Exchange server the threat actor was able to swap backdoors during each re-entry. The attack enabled the staged deployment of two separate backdoors across three infection waves: Deed RAT (also known as Snappybee), a ShadowPad successor leveraged by several China-linked espionage groups, and TernDoor, a malware strain recently identified in campaigns targeting telecommunications infrastructure in South America. Read full article.

8. US charges suspected Dream Market admin arrested in Germany – Bleeping Computer

The main administrator of the now defunct darknet marketplace, Dream Market, has been indicted by a federal grand just on money laundering charges. Owe Martin Andreson was charged with “six counts of international concealment money laundering and six counts of concealment money laundering” and with each charge having a possible 20-year prison sentence. Operating under the handle, “Speedstepper”, Andresen accessed dormant Dream Market wallets and moved millions of dollars to other accounts. German authorities have arrested Andresen and charged him with additional charges of concealment money laundering. The DOJ claims that in total Andresen is “alleged to have laundered over $2 million between August 2023 and April 2025.” Learn more.

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Social Engineering in 2026: When Deception Stops Looking Suspicious

Written by kathy hoffman on May 27, 2026. Posted in Blog.

May 27, 2026

For years, social engineering followed a familiar pattern. The messages were generic, the grammar was questionable, and the urgency often felt forced. Most organizations trained their people to look for those signs, and for a while, that worked.

That version of social engineering still exists. It just isn’t what’s working anymore.

What has changed is not the goal, but the execution. Social engineering has shifted from isolated attempts at deception to a more refined, scalable, and deeply contextual approach. The result is something far more difficult to detect, not because it is more aggressive, but because it feels normal.

The original discussion in DarkOwl’s breakdown of social engineering trends focused on the foundations of deception. Today, those foundations are being layered with automation, intelligence, and precision in ways that remove the very signals defenders were trained to rely on.

Personalization That Eliminates Doubt

Attackers are no longer guessing. They are building context.

Information pulled from previous breaches, public profiles, and even internal organizational structures is being used to craft messages that reflect real relationships and real work. Instead of broad outreach, the focus is on relevance. A message might reference a current project, a colleague, or a routine process that the recipient recognizes immediately.

This shift matters because it removes hesitation. When something looks familiar, it is far less likely to be questioned.

When “Well Written” Stops Being a Signal

For a long time, poor grammar and awkward phrasing were reliable indicators of phishing attempts. That signal has largely disappeared.

AI-generated communication has raised the baseline quality of social engineering. Messages are now clear, structured, and context-aware. More importantly, they can evolve. Attackers are no longer limited to a single message. They can sustain conversations, respond in real time, and adapt their tone based on how the target engages.

The absence of obvious mistakes does not indicate legitimacy anymore. It simply reflects the tools being used.

From Single Touchpoints to Coordinated Interactions

Social engineering is no longer confined to one channel. It often unfolds as a sequence.

An email might introduce the request, followed by a text message that reinforces urgency, and then a message in a collaboration platform that makes the interaction feel internal. In some cases, a phone call completes the chain, adding a human element that builds trust.

Each step supports the next. By the time a request is made, it no longer feels like an isolated interaction. It feels like part of an ongoing conversation.

Impersonation Without Friction

Impersonation has also evolved. It is no longer limited to copying a name or an email address.

With minimal source material, attackers can replicate voices and, in some cases, create convincing video interactions. This is particularly effective in environments where quick decisions are expected, and verification processes are informal. A familiar voice, paired with urgency, is often enough to override hesitation.

The difference now is not just who attackers claim to be, but how convincingly they can present that identity.

Turning Security Controls Into Pressure Points

One of the more subtle shifts is how attackers are interacting with security controls themselves.

Rather than bypassing protections like multi-factor authentication, they are manipulating user behavior around them. Repeated approval requests, well-timed prompts, and framing actions as routine system activity all create pressure to comply.

What was designed as a safeguard becomes part of the attack path. The decision is no longer technical. It is behavioral.

Precision in Psychological Targeting

At its core, social engineering has always relied on human response. What has changed is the level of precision behind it.

Instead of broad emotional triggers, attackers are aligning their approach with the context of the target. A finance employee may receive a time-sensitive payment request, while someone in HR might see a message framed around employee issues. The tone, timing, and framing are chosen intentionally.

These interactions are designed to feel appropriate, not alarming. And that is what makes them effective. The triggers themselves are familiar:

Urgency – often tied to deadlines or financial transactions
Authority – presented through executive or leadership requests
Curiosity – framed as internal documents or updates
Empathy – commonly used in HR or personal scenarios

These are not new concepts. What is new is how accurately they are applied.

A Feedback Loop That Keeps Improving

Attackers are not operating in isolation. Techniques that work are shared, refined, and reused.

Across darknet communities, successful approaches are discussed openly. Messaging templates, engagement strategies, and bypass techniques circulate quickly, allowing others to replicate and improve them. This creates a cycle where effective methods do not stay niche for long.

Social engineering is no longer just a tactic. It is an evolving system.

What This Shift Really Means

The most important change is not the technology being used. It is the disappearance of friction.

Older attacks relied on the target making a mistake. Modern attacks are designed to feel like the correct action. They align with expectations, mimic normal workflows, and remove the cues people were trained to question.

That makes detection less about spotting something obviously wrong and more about recognizing when something is subtly off.

And that is a harder skill to teach.

As social engineering continues to evolve, the challenge is no longer just awareness. It is adaptation. Because the most effective attacks are no longer the ones that look suspicious.

They are the ones that don’t.

Stay tuned for best practices. Follow us on LinkedIn.

What are Basic Web Application Attacks?

Written by DarkOwl Content Team on May 21, 2026. Posted in Blog.

May 21, 2026

In this blog series, we aim to explain and simplify some of the most commonly used terms. Previously, we have covered bullet proof hosting, CVEs, APIs, brute force attacks, zero-day exploits, doxing, data harvesting, IoCs, credential stuffing, ransomware as a service, and push bombing. In this edition, we dive into basic web application attacks.

Basic Web Application Attacks 101

A basic web application attack is an attempt to exploit vulnerabilities in a website or web app to gain unauthorized access, steal data, or disrupt service.

As organizations continue to migrate their operations to the cloud and rely heavily on web-based interfaces, the surface area for potential cyber threats has expanded significantly. Web applications power everything from online banking to internal business tools. Without proper fortification, they remain primary targets for malicious actors. Attackers are focusing their efforts on exploiting the applications themselves. Basic web application attacks are some of the most common methods threat actors use to compromise systems, steal data, and gain unauthorized access – and they don’t have to be complex. They exploit vulnerabilities in the application’s code, logic, or database connections.

These attacks often exploit vulnerabilities outlined by organizations like the OWASP, which tracks the most critical web security risks. The goal of these attacks varies, ranging from the theft of sensitive customer data and intellectual property to the total takeover of the administrative backend.

Understanding the fundamental methods attackers use to compromise these systems is the first step in building a resilient security posture. While there are dozens of techniques, let’s review the most common:

SQL Injection (SQLi): The attacker targets the server’s database and inserts malicious SQL code into an input field (like a login form or search bar). If the application does not properly sanitize this input, the malicious code is executed by the backend database, allowing the attacker to query, modify, or delete data directly from the database.
Cross-Site Scripting (XSS): The attacker targets the application’s users and injects malicious JavaScript into a webpage that other users then load. When a victim visits the compromised page, their browser executes the script, which can be used to steal session cookies, log keystrokes, hijack account credentials, or redirect the user to a fraudulent website. This works when applications don’t properly validate or escape user-generated content.
Broken Access Control: Access control ensures that users cannot act outside of their intended permissions. A failure in these controls—such as allowing a standard user to access an administrative URL or view another user’s private files—is known as Broken Access Control. This is a critical vulnerability that often leads to unauthorized information disclosure and data modification.
Broken Authentication: An attacker exploits weak passwords, session tokens, or login mechanisms to impersonate legitimate users — often through credential stuffing or brute force. This is made possible by oor password policies, lack of MFA, or predictable session tokens.
Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF): Attackers trick a logged-in user’s browser into making an unwanted request to a site they’re authenticated on. For example, while a user is authenticated in their banking app, they might click a malicious link in a different tab that triggers a hidden request to transfer funds. Because the user is already authenticated, the web application treats the request as legitimate. This can happen when applications trust requests from authenticated sessions without verifying their origin.

Basic web application attacks continue to persist and are so effective because they exploit fundamental weaknesses that are common across many organizations. Every internet-facing application represents a potential target for attackers, significantly expanding the available attack surface. Many of these attacks are also relatively simple to execute, often requiring minimal tooling and allowing threat actors to automate exploitation at scale. Despite their simplicity, the impact can be severe—even a single vulnerability may expose sensitive databases, compromise user accounts, or disrupt critical services. In many cases, these risks are amplified by human and development-related factors, including rushed deployment timelines, misconfigurations, and the absence of secure coding practices throughout the software development lifecycle.

Basic Web Application Attacks in the Wild

Most web application attacks follow a predictable lifecycle that allows threat actors to efficiently identify and exploit vulnerabilities. The process typically begins with reconnaissance, where attackers scan applications for exposed endpoints, login forms, APIs, and user input fields that may reveal potential weaknesses. Once areas of interest are identified, attackers move into vulnerability identification by testing inputs and application behavior for flaws such as injection points or insecure configurations. After discovering a viable weakness, the exploitation phase begins, during which attackers execute the attack by injecting malicious code, bypassing authentication controls, or hijacking user sessions. Successful exploitation is often followed by post-exploitation activity, including data exfiltration, privilege escalation, lateral movement, or establishing persistence within the environment. Because this process is structured and repeatable, web application attacks can be easily scaled across large numbers of targets.

The consequence of a successful web application attack includes: technical downtime, account takeover, data breaches, reputation damage, and financial loss.

Equifax

One of the most well-known examples of a web application attack occurred in 2017, when attackers exploited a vulnerability in the Apache Struts web application framework used by Equifax. The flaw allowed remote code execution through a vulnerable web application component. The breach exposed personally identifiable information (PII) of ~147 million individuals, including names, social security numbers, and birth dates. The incident highlighted how unpatched web application vulnerabilities can become entry points for large-scale data breaches.

Progress Software

In 2023, attackers exploited a SQL injection vulnerability in the MOVEit Transfer managed file transfer platform, allowing unauthorized access to sensitive data stored by thousands of organizations worldwide. The vulnerability was leveraged by the Clop ransomware group to extract data from government agencies, healthcare providers, universities, and financial institutions. The campaign ultimately impacted more than 2,000 organizations and exposed the data of nearly 100 million individuals, demonstrating how a single web application flaw can create widespread downstream impact.

Microsoft

In 2024, researchers identified a serious cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in on-premises deployments of Microsoft Dynamics 365. The flaw allowed attackers to inject malicious JavaScript into application pages through improperly sanitized input fields. If exploited, attackers could execute scripts within victim browsers, potentially leading to session hijacking, credential theft, or unauthorized actions performed under legitimate user accounts. The incident reinforced that XSS remains one of the most persistent and commonly exploited web application vulnerabilities.

Protection and Mitigation

In many cases, it’s not advanced techniques that cause the most damage— it’s the fundamentals done poorly. To defend against a web application attack, organizations need to reduce risk with a combination of secure development practices and defensive controls:

Input Validation and Sanitization: Never trust user input—validate and sanitize everything. Implement strict validation rules to ensure only the expected data types are processed.
Use Parameterized Queries: Prevent SQL injection by separating code from data. Using parameterized queries (prepared statements) is the most effective way to prevent SQL injection.
Implement Output Encoding: Protect against XSS by properly escaping content. A strong CSP (Content Security Policy) can significantly reduce the risk of XSS by restricting the sources from which scripts can be loaded.
Enforce Strong Authentication: Use MFA, secure session management, and robust password policies.
Regular Patching and Updates: keep frameworks, libraries, and servers up to date.
Security Testing and Audits: Conduct frequent vulnerability scans and manual penetration testing to identify and remediate flaws before they can be exploited by threat actors. Incorporate static and dynamic analysis, penetration testing, and vulnerability scanning.
Follow Established Frameworks: Leverage guidance from OWASP, including the OWASP Top 10.